Clericist Catholic Authors and the Crystallization of Historical Memory of WW1 in Lebanonist-Particularist Discourse, 1918-1922

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Resumen: Para los escritores libaneses clericales, ligados a Occidente por el francés y el latín, la masacre de la I Guerra Mundial evidenció que las ideologías pro-católica y secularista habían resultado fallidas para mantener la paz y la prosperidad en Europa. Los clericales se sentían atados al destino de los estados europeos, cuyo secularismo odiaban al vincularse estéticamente a las lenguas latinas. Éstos también sintieron la necesidad de un protector contra algunos musulmanes después de que la hostilidad turca en Monte Líbano destruyera la antigua ideología con tendencia al desarrollo del multisectarismo otomano.

Abstract: For those clerical Lebanese writers bound to the West by French and Latin, the slaughter of World War I showed that both pro-Catholic and secularist ideologies had failed to maintain peace and prosperity in Europe. The clericists felt they were tied to the fate of the European states the secularism of which they hated by binding themselves aesthetically to the Latin languages. They also felt the need of a protector against some Muslims after Turkish hostility in Mount Lebanon destroyed the old ideology of Ottoman multi-sectarian developmental tendency.


This study will analyze a sampling of Lebanese images and assessments of World War I taken from the clerical intellectual journal al-Mashriq, edited by Fr. Luis Shaykhū, and the more popular but likewise Jesuit-founded al-Bashīr newspaper from 1919-1925. A nativist tradition has existed in Maronite discourses that has been the reverse of eager to imbibe Europe’s patterns of Catholicism, or French or other Western languages, or the secularized

ideologies or histories of France and other Western societies. But as publications founded by European Catholics, and inclusive in their Catholicism rather than just Maronite, *al-Mashriq* and *al-Bashîr* carried the maximum range of reactions to the European as well as Middle Eastern theatres of the Great War.

THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE WARRING WESTERNERS

1. Images of France (and French-speaking Belgium) in WW1

1.1. Ambivalence to France and the West

The pre-World War I and post-WW1 setting of *al-Mashriq* had inculcated neither automatic support for Western powers such as France, nor automatic alienation from Muslim groups. Many clerical Catholic educators and writers in the 1920s feared that rising radical forces inspired by French anti-Christianity might soon take overall control of all levels of education in Lebanon, threatening both the clerics’ survival as an elite and the transmission of a sectionally modernized Catholicism to new generations. Opposed local writers argued that secularist education had to be expanded to integrate the heterogeneous sects of post-1920 Greater Lebanon lest it one day fall apart. The dislike both clericists and modernizing Christians were developing for French and Western cultures qua exclusionary absolutes in education and government was Arabist common ground with Muslims that could foster some features for a linguistic nationalism.

The World War in some ways had underscored the need of the region’s Christians for a Protector. But, in a sense, Shaykhū – ideologue revered of a Maronite Church that was buying more and more agricultural land and would under Patriarch Anṭūn ‘Arîdâh venture into modern services and manufactures – was reluctant to let even social democratic parties or trade unions pursue any special interest of poor groups within politics.

Most clericists and Lebanese modernists read French, and both groups

were anxious to prove to readers of Arabic that Europe was on their side. Such respect for France and the West among Christian Lebanese favored the secularists more than the clerics in the debate given the movement of many West European nationalist states and certainly the French state to post-Christian patterns and ideas.

However, the spread in Lebanon of French-medium institutions and of connections with the French state had, since the 18th century, improved the material welfare and the bargaining power of diverse categories of Maronites in the Muslim-dominated Ottoman Empire. Shaykhū and other clerics who felt little love for some central thought-patterns and institutions connected to the secular French state, had still received formal Christian education in French: that language bonded them aesthetically to that polity. This acculturation and the formal Catholicism of most Frenchmen had kept enough strength to rally those writers to a French state they disliked when the context became her survival in the face of Germany.

1.2. France in the War

The Lebanese clerics’ vision of the war was shaped by their bilingual bookishness as well as by religious emotions on which Allied propaganda played. Religious and other cultural sites influenced the opting for the French side by the clerical writers. Fascinated by the science of the new technology of long-range bombardment that France too developed in the War, Rafā’īl Nakhlah the Jesuit noted that German long-range artillery firing on Paris on 23 March 1918 and thereafter from 120 kilometers away killed in a church 79 people who had come for prayer on Good Friday. Germany’s indiscriminate [or intentional? neo-pagan?] bombardments of sacred places of the Christians such as Riems cathedral fueled Shaykhū’s choice of sides: the French troops did not destroy public buildings, churches and palaces and factories as the Germans did, except when they were fortified to shelter hostile Germans – sleight of hand that barely concealed that total war had brutalized the French, too, to religious and other art or sites or culture as precious in themselves. And Shaykhū now swallowed too the self-validating propaganda of the French that they, if few others, stood for principles and universal [secular] enterprises far wider than the nationalism firing the mayhem. A collapse of France would have ended “the freedom and liberty of the whole civilized world” – not a perspective in his Ottoman-era attacks upon freemasonry emanating from the anti-clerical laicist French polity.

As was the case in other Muslim or Christian magazines in the Middle East, the demands of conveying the incessantly expanding technology of modern warfare widened the scope and capacity of the literary Arabic of

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Shaykhū and his *al-Mashriq* colleagues in the wake of World War I. On the whole, they conveyed the unprecedented technology well in their preferred literary language.

Like many clerical Lebanese writers, Shaykhū could have a sharp eye for the technical and practical manifestations of science (eg. war-planes and tanks) despite being at odds with so many things in the overall spirit of the modern West. But old Christian energies to his mind underlay France’s new technologies of warfare. Shaykhū was trying to blend that French nationalism with Catholicism. The fighter pilot Georges-Marie Guynemer (1894-1917) in devastating the German airforce made people associate him with such “heroes” as Peter the Hermit and [recently canonized] Joan of Arc. Here, Shaykhū had got close to sectors of medieval Christian history that some secular French writers too could and did integrate into their nationalism after a fashion. But he was unmindful of how much cultivated Muslim Arab readers might be antagonized by such linking of his Catholic group’s ethos and a modern France that was now in Lebanon to Peter, a quasi-Frenchman whose incitatory preachings across Europe raised a huge if motley army for the crusade proclaimed by Pope Urban II. Hermit Peter preached a sermon on the Mount of Olives shortly before the Frankish forces stormed Jerusalem in 1096, wresting the al-Aqsa mosque from the Islamic world with massacres of any Muslims.

Shaykhū gave a sharp overview of the evolution of tanks during WW1 – “those fortified mobile machines equipped with machineguns that played an important role in the [World] War especially in its late period, casting fear into the souls of the Germans and directing death at their armies”. However, the recent post-WW1 local history of Lebanon and Syria perhaps led Shaykhū to overrate their importance earlier in the fighting in Europe. “Tanks also played a considerable role in the recent triumph of the French against [Faysal’s Ḥijāzi-Syrian] troops, opening up for them the road to Damascus. Their number in the French army is [now] several thousand”. Thus, Shaykhū’s approval of France’s scientifically innovative military might came in the context of his loyalty to her at that point as a protector and at least patron to whom he gave title to crush neighboring Arab polities that could destabilize the fragile new Lebanon.

Fr Shaykhū’s (as the Jesuit Rafā’il Nakhlāh’s) accounts of the military technologies the various combatants evolved in WW1 stand up today beside recent Western military overviews. However, his residence in the Arab world obscured from him much of the ongoing crisis the War had bequeathed in the morale of the Westerners. Rather, his stance to the War was an out-of-date ideological endorsement of the polity that now protected Lebanon. In her

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contest with Germany, France had functioned as the fulcrum of the world of Civilization in Asia and Africa as well as upon the battlefields of Europe. Despite all he knew of how many French people the War had killed and maimed, his ultimate tone was triumphalist in a way that rang hollow: France fought on steadfastly for more than four years through the terrors of the War until the laurels of total victory were placed upon her head.\(^4\)

1.3. Belgium: Catholicism and Resistant Patriotism

When imaging World War 1, Shaykhū’s Francophone pan-Catholicism did not allow him to develop the critical nuances about the Elder Daughter of the Church which could mark his discussion when the context was not the French polity’s survival. His history of the War characterized the Belgium polity and its ruling groups as simplistically. For him, Belgium was the small Catholic victim of an implicitly almost non-Christian Germany. All the conflicting states of Europe had undertaken in their preceding pacts not to violate the borders of Belgium, but Germany violated international law when she invaded that small state. Faced with so overwhelmingly larger an occupying state, Belgium could have submitted with only verbal protests, the approach tiny Luxembourg understandably took. But Belgium’s gallant king preferred to risk his state “amid the sympathy of the whole civilized world”. Shaykhū ascribed to Kaiser Wilhelm II a letter that “all things have to be burnt and all – men, women and the elderly – killed and every tree and house destroyed because such means of terror can end the war before two months pass”. Belgium’s Catholicity, her official French language and culture, and the function of her resistance in delaying Germany’s attack on France as the latter mobilized, all pushed Shaykhū to idealize that small polity and its ruling class.

While his book usually characterized the War’s theatres in traditional military terms, Shaykhū’s tribute to Belgium did take some account of civilian suffering and resistance. He described how the Belgian civilians brought out an underground daily newspaper that the occupiers could not trace, and which gave details of their tricks and oppression to the whole world. However, Shaykhū placed an iconic hero who blended the French language and high Catholicism with Belgian nationalism at the head of the resistance. “That gallant primate, the honor of the religion, learning and the homeland, the cardinal [Desiree Joseph] Mercier defended the rights of his flock without regard to the governors of the Germans, who spared no effort to win him over, or to their threats”\(^5\).

Cardinal Mercier (1851-1926) had in 1882 been commissioned to inaugurate the chair of Thomistic philosophy created at the University of Louvain at the request of Pope Leo XIII. His Institut Superior de Philosophie there issued the *Revue neo-Scholastique*, which the learned Jesuit Shaykhū could have read before the war. Mercier’s reference to biology, physiology, neurology and the modern scientific and social disciplines would fit with the efforts of the *al-Mashriq* clericists to attach Europe’s (especially France’s) modern sciences to the religion. But Shaykhū’s fusion of the sacred with political resistance in Belgium saw no shadings to either Mercier or the polity and nationalism he represented. Mercier identified the concept of “la patrie” with which he fired Belgians during World War I unconditionally with a unitary Belgium defined by French: he had no concept of the mounting grievances of his country’s subordinated Dutch-speaking Flemings.\(^6\) Linguistically repressive at home, that polity’s pitiless exploitation of the Congolese under King Leopold II (r. 1885-1908) had disturbed Europe and the U.S. even in that era.

The harsh binary oppositions that Shaykhū and other Catholic Lebanese writers drew between despotic militarist, aggressive Germany and parliamentary, “free”, self-defending France and Belgium showed the capacity of an auxiliary language to block out shades and nuances in a far-off reality to which it gave access. Shaykhū did not fully understand that the French military, in order to get in the first blow, were as eager to thrust into neutral Belgium as their German peers. However, France’s Republican politicians did have more control (Britain’s civilian leaders had more again) over the military than did Germany’s civilian politicians and officials.

Lebanon’s Catholic writers had not wholly dreamed up that France and Belgium’s nationalisms became more Catholic as those two nations resisted Germany. The departure of the secular state’s sometimes anti-Christian officials and teachers had shifted leadership and resistance in Belgium and Northern France to clerics and nuns whom German troops really could ill-treat in reprisals.\(^7\) The secular leaders themselves and the clericists together now developed such cultural instruments as the Joan of Arc cult in inclusive ways that could unite all categories in the nation. The new association of Catholicism with political patriotism unfolding in the French language would feed accumulating bracketing of Religion and Homeland in the development of Lebanese particularist thought down the 1920s and 1930s.

### 2. Images of other Allied States

Apart from France, gigantic, modern America, and Russia, the clerical Lebanese writers scanned did not present very clear or solid accounts of most

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\(^7\) See H. STRACHAN, *The First World War*, pp. 1117-1118.
other pro-Entente countries fighting in the Allied camp as states, societies or cultures.

Shaykhū’s account blended the changing military situations of Russia with her cultural make-up. Her historical close racial relations with Serbia virtually forced her to enter the War when Austria issued her ultimatum. It was not just his dislike of new forms of self-assertion by “lower” classes or confiscation of property that made him denounce the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power. Shaykhū was disturbed by the looting of monasteries and destruction of churches that he had not dreamed up.

Insightful about linguistic, religious and class divisions that foredoomed the war effort of the Tsarist Empire, Shaykhū was more military and accepting of the formal state-entity in his overview of Italy’s participation in the War. Pope Pius X (1903-1914) had at last authorized local Catholics to vote in the Italian nationalist state with which his predecessors had struggled for forty years. Shaykhū duly swallowed the images of that shaky state that it had mobilized the masses of the population for the total war and that Italian high culture directed how people thought: “the poet Gabriele D’Annunzio raised up intrepid initiative in the people with his resounding odes so that the Italian armies surged forward as a torrential flood”. Shaykhū, though, did not ask how many Italians could have comprehended either D’Annunzio’s language or his almost proto-fascist nationalist concepts.

Overall, Shaykhū believed that Italy had proven her mettle in her battles for mountainous terrain with more than a million Austro-Hungarian troops in 1915-1918: the world that had had scant regard for Italy militarily now recognized the bravery and fortitude of her troops. Shaykhū gave a careful review of the swings of Rome’s foreign policy prior to her late entry in 1915. He repeated the official narrative that the Central States with whom she had been had not informed Italy that war was coming, as though she were of no account, and that Austria had derogated from her rights in the Balkans in conquering Serbia and moving against Albania. Austria had put off handing Trieste over to Italy, which duly jumped over to the states of the Triple Entente. Still, Shaykhū’s data showed Italy in undignified straits when in 1918 Axis forces broke through to the plains to Venice and British and French forces had to come rushing.

Although it traced some linkages between high culture, nationalism, state policy and territorial tensions in the region, Shaykhū’s account of Italy disappoints. It was very Catholic in a whimsical way: despite his rage against Germany and Turkey elsewhere, for him it was Divine providence that Italy’s government rightly stayed neutral for a time because that allowed the Cardinals of the world to come to “the capital of Catholicism” in 1914 to elect

the successor to the just-deceased Pope Pius X. Most of “the Italian people” was hoping at that point that their state would stay neutral to the end of the War.\footnote{L. SHAYKHū, “Aʿzamu ʿtamah”, al-Mashriq (August 1920), pp. 628-632.}

Shaykhū had glimpsed that the heterogeneity of the Tsarist empire foredoomed it to collapse in the War. As a West-attuned Jesuit who knew Italian high clerics in Lebanon-Syria, and given the secular-ameliorist nationalist Italian state’s past conflicts with the Church, he could have clamped some critical analysis down on the fragile unity of an Italian polity whose recently-incorporated populations spoke distinct languages, and many of whose troops in WW1 did not understand the meaning of even the term “Italy” for which they were being ordered to fight – the neo-*country* that was indeed the recent invention of a bourgeoisie.\footnote{L. SHAYKHū, “Aʿzamu ʿtamah”, al-Mashriq (August 1920), pp. 628-632.. For many of the troops' incomprehension of even the name “Italy”, see Paul CORNER, “The Italian Experience of World War I: National Formation or National Disintegration?”, paper read at the ‘International Conference on the First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean’, German Institute for Oriental Studies Beirut, 28 April 2001. Latin, as much as the book-language of Dante, Boccaccio and Petrarch, had been the shared literary language of the areas that were proclaimed as “Italy” in 1861: thus, such languages as Sicilian and Sardinian remained dominant until cinema and TV and classrooms ended them from the late 1950s. Ernest Pulgram (1958) opted to “speak of Italian dialects rather than languages, perhaps for no better reason than that all of Italy once was and now is again a political unit, and does possess a national standard language”— which is to ignore the almost millenium and a half of disparate political units and birth of discrete languages that had intervened between the collapse of Roman power and the re-proclamation of the unit “Italy” in 1861. See Ernest PULGRAM, The Tongues of Italy: Prehistory and History (Harvard, 1958), p. 46. As Italy’s Minister of Education Martini had wisecracked back in 1896, “Italy has now been created: it remains to make the Italians”: Gilles PICOUT, “Politisation et intégration nationale en italie: les campagnes toscannes des années 1860”, Revue Historique (January-March 2001), p. 84. However, there were no political movements in Sicily or Sardinia to secede from Italy at the time Shaykhū wrote, in contrast to the tensions he registered in the Tsarist empire: regional nationalisms in Italy only came following WW2. Communication from Dr John HAJEK, Head of Department of French and Italian Studies at Melbourne University, Australia, 22 November 2001.}

Shaykhū did not grasp the cultural and kinship bonds that would draw the dominant U.S. groups towards the side of Britain during World War I. Given the profitability of the munitions the U.S. was selling to all the parties, Americans had never conceived that they might enter the War, he imagined. Then the German High Command in 1917 launched indiscriminate submarine warfare against all international shipping, even that of neutral states, gambling that cutting Triple Entente supplies to France could bring a swift victory. As Shaykhū observed, the sinkings enraged most peoples, “in particular the Americans given their pride and drive to preserve the freedom of nations for
which they are noted", leading President Wilson to declare war on Germany on 2 April 1917. Shaykhū voiced more indignation against President Wilson for earlier pursuing a peace supposedly favorable to Germany, and for her slowness to join the War, than he had towards the state of sacred Rome. But he praised the 1,428,000 American troops who finally landed in France: once French CIC General Joffre trained them, they fought the Germans “with rare courage as though French honor had materialized in them” – a strong compliment from Shaykhū when the context was France’s survival. Perhaps the Americans were thanking France on the soil of Europe for the aid she had once given America for its original winning of its independence – a motif that would have been fostered in Shaykhū by long-standing French literary discourse.

President Wilson, though, had “somewhat muddied his glory by issuing unclear statements about liberating the nations and granting them independence”: Shaykhū feared that the unleashing of national demands could bring destruction and catastrophes worse than those of the last war.12 Here Shaykhū was wary of the claims of Arab nationalisms or entities wider than Lebanon, a novel, controversial polity.

Shaykhū and al-Mashriq’s analyses of WW1 were bounded by statal cultures, conventional patterns of diplomatic interactions, formal military balances between states and the degrees of courage of given armies – ethos – as determinants of the outbreak and outcomes of wars. Still, the economic explications of some French and British writers and perhaps even from the socialist and Communist enemy could also figure. Shaykhū described the War as “economic more than a matter of international relations [since] Germany ignited it only in order to expand its territories and to open markets for its commerce,” – which could point to pacifist counter-discourses in Britain (eg. Norman Angell) that Britain’s economic exclusion forced Germany to go to war.13 Shaykhū observed that the Kaiser had some grounds for his hopes in the leadup that the British might stay out of the War because of “their concern for their trade: war would expand it and guarantee huge profits because it would freeze the trades of the combatant powers”14

Thus, Shaykhū sometimes ascribed economic motives to the choices and actions of states. Moreover, he and his colleagues hoped that the French mandate they championed would bring economic modernization and profits to Lebanon.

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3. Conzeptualization of Germans

Wilhelmian Germany became more and more unattractive to pro-clerical Maronites well before WW1 because of its tightening alliance with the central government in Constantinople that from 1908 was usually led by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The new Young Turk elite gave much more scope to threatening secular ideas throughout the whole Empire than had Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid with whom Maronite Patriarch Ilyâs al-Ḥuwâyyik had built up a live-and-let-live alliance in which he conceivably may have helped the Ottoman government repress local Maronite secularists. The CUP also had centralizing impulses, and Germany was helping it improve its military capacities: as soon as they brought the Ottoman State into the War, the CUP militarily ended Mountain Lebanon’s autonomy. After WW1, Christian authors in Arabic rapped “Germany, the aider of Turkey” for “allowing” sweeping violence by Turks, Kurds and Circassians against [mainly Syriac-speaking and Armenian] Christians in Mesopotamia and [in today’s Turkey] Diyar Bakr, Mardin, Tur ‘Abdin etc during the War – criminality by association rather than having taken part.

More forward-thinking voices from among even the ranks of the vengeful French themselves were nudging Lebanon’s Catholics to a more sympathetic understanding of the deep harm the late conflict and the post-War reparations had caused to Germany as well. The Alsatian-French author Got had reached the conclusion in his on-site researches with the French Mission in Berlin that Germany would never be able to lift itself to its feet again, however favorable conditions might become, except after long years given the reparations it had to pay back to the Allies as compensation for everything it had destroyed in other countries. Thus, the Treaty of Versailles had to be revised. (Got was overly pessimistic: the German currency was to restabilize in 1923, and the following year the Allies agreed to evacuate the Ruhr and grant Germany a more realistic payment schedule for reparations: by 1927, German industry had regained its 1913 high, but then the Great Depression hit all the world).

4. Connections through Catholicism to Germans

Catholic universalism finally reasserted itself – if weakly – over the French nationalism given a Christian patina, to which their auxiliary language had opened these clerical Lebanese. In one brief note, Shaykh Ḫâdī did rap “some

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17 Review by Fr. Gabriel Levenq of (Dr) Ambroise Got’s L’Allemagne après la Débâcle (Strasbourg, 1919), in al-Mashriq (July 1920), p. 553.
extremists” in the victorious Allied powers who were expelling Catholic German missionaries from their Third World missions “lest, it is contended, they misuse religious evangelization as a means to propagate... love towards their homeland”. Shaykhū added his “weak voice” to that of the Pope and others to protest at restrictions that were further depriving a number of lands of the blessings of evangelizing “Christian civilization”, given that the World War had cut down so many missionaries. The Allies could still try any Germans charged to have deformed the religion into an instrument for temporal aims, so alien to the thinking of Catholic missionaries.18 [As though some Francophone Western missionaries had not inculcated love of the French state in the Fertile Crescent!]

In 1922, the science-aware Rafʾīl Nakhlah al-Yasūʿī tried to supplement or modify the hostile image of Germany that the French language had so deeply implanted in the opinion-makers of “the Catholics of the East” whom he now addressed. Nakhlah voiced understanding of the hatred that came from all corners against the people of the “covetous” Wilhelm II from its brilliant triumph in the 1870 war with France to its igniting of the flames of the late World War that had spread death and destruction over all areas of Europe. He took issue, though, with some who “have exaggeratedly dismissed Germany as in its entirety a purely materialist civilization that uses intellectual powers or the progress of the sciences and arts only to increase material prosperity and to expand the country by violating the rights of neighboring nations.” In correction [to this Catholic view of Germany in the Arabic lands], Nakhlah highlighted as an instance of “real eternal civilization – justice, mercy [religion and ethics]” – in German life the association of Catholic pupils in German secondary schools, the Neudeutschland or Young Germany, founded immediately after the War and which by 1922 now had 25,000 members. Resolved to spread “Chastity” in “insolent” Weimar Germany, the students [like the clericists in France-mandated Lebanon] fought all that could foster promiscuity and prostitution in literature, cinema, theatre, public art, and fashions.19

Bismarck’s – Protestantism-motivated? – Kulturkampf against Catholic schools was in the memory of Lebanon’s Catholics when WW1 came. The less France-bound Nakhlah, who had some real Catholic universalism, liked Jesuit-directed Young Germany’s stress on science beside religion. This and its retention of Homeland at the side of religion helped shape predilections now being passed on to the Maronite discursive tradition. (Some Germans were to assess long afterwards that such Catholic German youth movements and

schools paved the way to the conversion of their middle-class youths to Nazism because they taught nationality and sniped at the urban, pluralist society of modernity emerging under Weimar.  

Rafīʿ Nakhlah hoped, wrongly, that Germany could be redeemed into a polity in which Catholicism could flourish after the War. Yet, WW1 had made most literate Maronites swallow whole for the long term French nationalism’s hatred of Germany, albeit with some adaption to clericist priorities. The Catholic clerical media in Lebanon mainly supported the most hard-line French positions towards Germany well into the 1920s. In early 1923, al-Bashīr rapped strikes by miners, boycotts and passive resistance against the French occupation in the Ruhr, and claims that by seizing coal mines and factories France had paralysed commerce and industry there. In refutation, al-Bashīr set out the assessments of the French ultrist politicians. In occupying the Ruhr after WW1, France had only been matching Germany, which in 1870 occupied provinces of France that she only evacuated after getting reparations for her losses in that war. France had to protect herself lest Germany catch her off-guard again.  

Militarism: al-Bashīr excerpted accusations by War Minister Maginot in the French parliament that Germany was trying to rebuild its forces. Thus, France had to apply conscription to build a strong army of 52 divisions with “brutal” budgetary allocations.  

The high drama of France’s struggle for survival in WW1 implanted in the literate discourse of the Maronites and Melkites many anti-German motifs from French nationalism. Some Lebanese Christian writers remained jumpy in the 1920s that the violence and mayhem of World War I could resume at any time. They continued to worry about France’s safety from the expansionism of Germany, towards which they would remain suspicious and hostile in its Nazi period, in common with Muslim liberal intellectuals in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent.  

By 1920, a friends-enemies dichotomy – “liberal” France versus militarist, post-Christian Germany – had been set for the long term into the Lebanese Catholic ethos.  

4. World War I’s Impact upon Ideology  

The havoc of WWI was assessed – or experienced – by many in Lebanon as an end of hope and of meaning in history. Preceding assumptions among Lebanon’s Catholics that God or alternatively Progress (both as conceptualized from Europe) would order history towards human welfare faced a severe

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challenge from the death of millions. Clericist Catholic ideologues had to restructure Catholic Christianity to make it prevent or contain future conflict. The War had similarly devastated secular world-views in the Arab East. The Western states that had claimed to stand for Enlightenment, rationality and Progress had shown their capacity for atavistic devastation against each other. Thus, Lebanese and other Arab quasi-secularists now searched for supplementary meanings from established religions, although mostly in a theosophical way.

As disrespect spread in the world towards European states and cultures, the Maronite clerical writers had to respond to the maneuverings of Muslim apologists, the Arab theosophists and freemasons and the Arab post-Christian anti-clerics to highlight their creeds, not Catholicism, as the solutions to conflict. Both post-Christian radical secularists and modernist salafi Islamists had long cited the crusader wars and the Inquisition as past violence and terror by the Church of Rome. An *al-Mashriq* article by Fr. Butrus Faraj Şufayr, “The Church and Resistance to Wars” welcomed that a group of eminent Englishmen were launching a League of Religions. Its ambition was to organize spiritual forces in the world to strengthen general peace and the joint interests of nations. *Al-Mashriq* recognized among those attending the England conference names of people representing different religions and sects, bishops and rabbis, as well as major thinkers and people working for social reform. “Those who in ancient and modern history worked most to end wars, or at least lessen their horrors, were the men of religion, and in particular the high clerics of the most widespread religion in the world, the Catholic Church”.

Fr. Şufayr had partly penned his article out of fury at an essay by the West-acculturated Indian Syed Ameer ‘Alī (1849-1928), translated in Egypt’s journal *al-Bayān*, which had striven to contrast Islam to the failure of Christianity after the Roman Empire adopted it to at all lessen the horrors of wars, oppression and extermination: Christianity had refused to address issues of international relations and reciprocal duties between nations. Şufayr retorted that Jesus set up the Church in the first place as the mechanism to establish in this world, after He ascended, his social teachings, and peace in given societies and in international relations. As Paul had put it, there no more remained amongst those who accepted Christ Jew nor Greek, not slave nor freeman, neither male nor female: all of them have become equal and one in the Messiah (Galatians 3:28). Şufayr cited NT verses that exhorted to forbearing pacifism even towards enemies. He challenged the Islamic apologists to muster for Islam clear verses on that level.

Far from being part of past or recent violence in Europe, the Church and its Popes had always acted as the arbiter to decide between kings and princes whose proclivities could have ignited war and social conflict, retorted Şufayr. In the middle ages, popes in Rome, when they saw ill-treatment by some Kings against their subjects, defended those who had been oppressed without any
fear of the power that those tyrants exercised. Henry IV, the Emperor of Germany who ignited in Europe a war that inflicted catastrophes on its lands, finally was forced to submit and desist before the wise old man of Rome.

This characterization by Şufayr ignored that Pope Gregory VII (1073-85) was no such wise arbitrator who only intervened to bridle kings after they became violent and expansionist or repressive at home. Rather, it was the simultaneous drives of both he and Henry IV to expand their respective powersystems that drew them to their collisions. Gregory may have founded the Papacy’s long-term supremacy over the Catholic churches and its claim to supervise the secular rulers of Europe, but in his life-time his drive to reduce kings to vassals sparked grotesque situations of double-popes and alternative kings or emperors for Germany and fighting and looting in holy Rome that far from fostered peace or stability or any regard for religion and the Church.

Şufayr argued that the papacy carried its immemorial arbitrative role in international high politics forward into modern history when its mediation by Pope Leo XIII in 1885 settled the conflict that developed between Germany and Spain over the Caroline Islands. Given the Church’s track-record in settling a host of disputes and wars, the League of Nations should incorporate it into modern peacemaking, ending the sideling. “Would not the world have avoided all the terrors and hatreds of the last World War, had Austria and Serbia both taken to the Holy See the issues of that conflict that set off all these wars and caused so much suffering?” Thus, Şufayr fleet over the extent to which the international Catholic church had been cut down, sidelined, marginalized and hit by 19th century secularist, anti-clerical or downrightly anti-Christian regimes in Europe and Latin America that were determined to transform their national societies and their world standing without any trammels or meddling from the Church.

Lebanon’s clericists remained on the defensive against Arab secularists who held up modern Europe’s secularism. But Şufayr sought in the late War a religious imperative in history. “All the development of modern sciences only turned them into a terrible instrument that have made War unprecedentedly barbarous and destructive”. Thus, only religions could bring the natures of people under control.

Şufayr rebutted the charges from Islamists and Christian-born Arab free-thinkers that the church had itself committed or incited military aggressions. The popes had maintained properties to sustain the church, and this understandably led to the creation of a state which the Pope of Rome then had to defend by force if it were invaded. (Answering radically secular Italian nationalists?) The crusader wars and those of the European states against the expansionist Ottoman Empire were only defensive and proportionate. The Muslims themselves [= Arab nationalists including his bete noire Rashīd Riḍā, Egypto-Syrian editor of al-Manâr] as well as the Christians had condemned the Ottoman Empire. Still, charges of the Arab free-thinkers and such salafists
as Rida and his mentor Muhammad ‘Abduh and the acculturated Muslim apologists about the “fanatical” crusades and Inquisition had cut close to home.

We should not overrate ecumenical glimmerings in Fr. Şufayr that devastation in the late War now could force clergy of varied religions to work together. Şufayr might indeed accept even the odd token rabbi, but he voiced no sense that Muslim clerics might have to be inducted into the peace-making, or that Lebanon’s Catholics had anything to learn from the Islam massively flowing around them.

Şufayr’s semi-quietist passages that religion and the Church could only ameliorate, not end, social injustice could have been closer to Christianity’s New Testament and sense of original sin. But the WW1 havoc and the taunts from the Islamists had pushed him to make Jesus the founder of International Law as he claimed a role for the Catholic Church in international relations and politics like that that Islam’s modernists were now imaging for Islam.

It needed strenuous footwork to deny after 1918 that Christianity and its institutions had failed to motivate its adherents in Europe and the West towards peace and constructive solutions. Catholic writers and media in Lebanon were restructuring Catholicism in order to maintain it, but many felt that other instruments and groups had to be synthesized with Christianity to save humanity. Thus, al-Mashriq also gave a hearing to the new international mechanism of the League of Nations, more neutral and secular than the Church, which it saw as set up by governments in response to pressure from the populations that had lost so much blood. The author, Emile Tayyân, was a student at the French Law School who was to become a lecturer in Law at St Joseph’s College. In 1920, the young Tayyân was in places Francophile in a way conventional among Maronites at that time. France had acted rightly to exclude Germany from the League of Nations following World War I: a League meant to promote freedom and justice and the observance of international undertakings could not admit states that had constantly broken their contracts and undertakings and barbarically swooped down upon others [= Germany’s invasion of Belgium and France]. Since actions by the League had to be adopted in advance by unanimous vote, it had been right to exclude such states as Germany and Soviet Russia that it had to control.

In places, though, Tayyân’s youthful essay diverged from the battered secular-ameliorist ideology of the French State whose language he loved. Intentionally or not, he might have been feeding the reaction among Christian Lebanese against Westerners in general in the wake of WW1, sparked by international realpolitik, contempt from French personnel and military in Lebanon, and by cultural incompatibility. In a critique of a range of Western

states, not just Germany alone, Tayyān condemned the colonialist expansionism that Britain had carried forward through WW1 and the League structure itself. He feared that her takeover of Germany’s former colonies (eg. South West Africa and Cameroon) with the League’s ratification would become permanent since none of its texts gave it either the title or the means to supervise and end such supposed “protectorates” or “trusteeships”. Even if the League had such a function nominally, who was there to compel the imperial state to withdraw from a trustee territory as its population became more able to govern itself? While dislike of Britain and being Francophile could go together in the 1920s, Tayyān then denounced Rome as a precursor of “civilized” states bent on conquests in his day. The nature of human beings has not changed for thousands of years: the ancient Romans when they conquered a town, depriving it of its liberty, used to then term it free or allied. “We only hope that the new words will amount to more than a veil”. Whatever his exact intention, Tayyān had got very close here to France which presented herself as the Latin successor of imperial Rome in the Levant after WW1.

Most groups of literate Lebanese Catholics had the strong bond of language to the thought and the survival of France. Yet many writers at least sometimes hinted edginess towards the hierarchical imperialism of the Western states. WW1 had shown again that constructive ideologies articulated from the West might not be able to contain violence and evil, or its Catholic and secular streams be synthesized.

PERCEPTIONS OF WW1 CONFLICTS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

1. The War in Lebanon

1.1. The Functions of the Indigenous Martyrs

The formal execution or murder by some Turks of Catholic or Muslim Lebanese/Syrians shortly before or during World War I could define in two ways the indigenous nation-community that the clericists would henceforth strive to achieve. On one hand, if the items defined the Turks as Muslim and the victims as Christian, the events could alienate the Christian readership from not just the Turks but from Muslim Arabs of the Syrian interior and longer littoral. In the other direction, if Muslim Arab victims were also perceived as co-victims because of the literary Arabic they shared with the Maronites, then that could foster political community with wider Islamo-Arab populations – and perhaps Lebanon’s affiliation to some pan-Syrian or pan-Arab entity.

Of the two possibilities, most items on pre-1918 Catholic victims that al-Mashriq carried fostered Lebanonism, but in an incomplete way. al-Mashriq

published a retrospect in 1921 on the lives and execution of the two brothers Filb and Farid al-Khāzín (from a feudal family). It represented Filb al-Khāzín (1865-1916) as from his youth having protested abuses of the Turks under the mutasarrif Wasa Pasha (governed Mountain Lebanon 1883-1892) from the Egyptian press. Once the French Consul appointed Filb an honorary dragoman, the two brothers were emboldened to launch the newspaper al-Arz (The Cedar) which fiercely defended not just Lebanon’s internationally-guaranteed autonomy but, perhaps equally, the ancient “sacred rights” (al-‘Īṣaqaq al-muqaddasah) of the protector France in the homeland. When Italy seized Libya from the Ottoman Empire, its armored cruisers sank two Ottoman torpedo ships in Beirut harbour. Filb’s lament at that time was that it had not been done by France, which alone among the Powers had the right to conduct such actions “in these lands”. Clearly, the Ottoman central government one day might have more to fear from the pair than words or editorializing, but the early perspective of al-Mashriq in 1921 was of a recent Ottoman system in which the printed page could muster immense political power in itself and thus had to be controlled or repressed. The al-Mashriq retrospect speculated that it was the publication by the brothers in several volumes of Arabic translations of the correspondence between the Powers establishing France’s maternal role and rights in Lebanon that made Jamāl Pasha, the last Turkish governor of Syria, decide to execute Filb and Farid.

The martyrs who sacrifice their lives for the particularist homeland are simultaneously sustained by a Christianity acclimated to the Catholicism of Europe’s Latin peoples, eg. France. The two brothers had expected from the first day of the sitting of the court that it would sentence them to death as it had all others. They were sustained in jail as they prepared themselves for their final journey to their Creator and that other “heavenly Homeland” by their regular reading of Thomas Akempis’ The Imitation of Christ, as well as prayer and meditation. There was a touch of hagiography in some details of the last weeks of the al-Khāzín brothers: for example their refusal to eat more than the needed minimum of the prison fare so that they could donate the rest to the poor.

In regard to current political context and functions, the al-Mashriq tribute was stylizing the death of Filb and Farid al-Khāzín to make it of use in the mobilization of Maronite audiences to the side of France in the ideologically much less clear-cut situation that was developing as France’s imposition of her non-pious rule hit the Arabic culture, the political dignity and the solid, simple Christian religious values of the Maronites. French mandatory rule was turning out to be not quite the expected liberation or Pan-Catholic conjunction with a Christian protector. At least some Maronites had been showing signs since 1918 of now wanting to distance France by some sort of linkage to hinterland Muslim Syrian Arabs in a polity to be centered around Damascus. Ritual commemoration of model martyrs oriented to Latin Catholicism and to France
Dennis Walker

could help contain such swings among al-Mashriq’s elite readership.

Greater political openness to Muslims in a context of the reaction against France after 1918 would be no new thing for Maronites or Melkites. Before 1914, various secular-minded groups (and Maronite Patriarch Ilyās Buṭrus al-Ḥuwawyik before 1908 and CUP rule) had at points sought closer political relations with Turks and/or Muslim Arabs in the sprawling, potentially lucrative Ottoman Empire. Such subversive precursors of affiliation to the Arab lands at expense of France had to be excised from Lebanon’s history. The Francophile particularists mustered the strong narrative of suffering and martyrdom for God and Homeland to nullify the plurality of pre-1914 Lebanese Catholic history and ideologies. For a range of Catholics, martyrdoms during World War I finally showed the impossibility of affiliating to at least some Muslims in a political community, with distancing of the West’s Christian powers, which integrative Ottomanism by some Maronites had already tried.

The (pre-WW1) memory that enraged the writer most was “the day that Lebanese faction rose up in the wake of the proclamation of the Ottoman constitution [after the CUP coup of 1908] to insist that Lebanon had to elect representatives to the restored Turkish parliament” in Istanbul. In this, the secularist-Ottomanist faction among the Maronites was being manipulated by Turkish officials and politicians to “deny Lebanon its independence and thereby prevent the European states from intervening in the affairs of this land/these lands” (ḥādhihi-l-bilād). The two al-Khāzīn brothers blocked “those of the other doctrine” with the “unrelenting” (but not very physical) war they waged from their newspaper al-’Arz. Their “logical” territorial nationalism (waṭaniyyah) presented legally airtight refutations: sending representatives to Constantinople would have violated Lebanon’s autonomy (“self-independence”) granted under a Constitution guaranteed by the great powers.

The holy blood of the saint-particularists whom Jamāl martyred opened the way to dismiss those who had worked for a humane political community with Ottoman Muslims as materialist opportunists in contrast. Yet these very denunciations underscored institutions and processes that had been operating to integrate Muslim Turks, Muslim Arabs, and Arabic Christians prior to the War and the martyrdoms. Archbishop ’Abdallāh al-Khūrī’s 1921 elegy denounced “public posts (al-ważāḥ) that make people remiss from serious work, inclining them to prefer personal interest over the collective interest. Everyone knows how widespread this disease became in Turkey and Lebanon”. But, the pure love of the two brothers for their homeland had made them spurn all posts the government offered to win their silence about its evil deeds. The two brothers’ construction of patriotism (al-waṭaniyyah) only allowed them to court the protection of France which alone would actualize the homeland’s interest.
Al-Mashriq imagined that the blood of the martyrs ended any possibility of some humane political community with Turks. For this, the Archbishop defined the group the two martyrs defended as Christian – yet it did not so fuse the Turkish enemy with Islam as to include Arab Muslims. The sufferings of Arabic, Syriac and Armenian Christians during World War 1 could activate ideas that would polarize those all together against Muslims in general or Islam. But the anti-Turkism of 1920s clericist-Catholic Lebanese writings that reconstructed memories of WW1 repression, martyrdom and suffering to fuel a new nationhood could keep up some affiliation to the hinterland’s Arab Muslims. A sense that Syrian and other Muslim Arabs had been colleagues with Lebanese Christians in a joint linguistic-cum-ethnic coalition against the Turks in the wide Ottoman Empire was still vivid in al-Mashriq’s 1921 tribute to “the two martyrs of Lebanon.”

As soon as their interrogation began, Archbishop ‘Abdallah al-Khūrī wrote, Fīlib and his brother knew that they were heading for the same fate as “an elite of the [leading] men of Syria and Lebanon who were detained with them, and who were driven either to Damascus (al-Shām) or to Beirut for sentences of execution to be carried out against them – figures like [Muslims] Shāfiq al-Mu‘ayyad and ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahrāwī whose bravery and preparedness to sacrifice their lives for the suffering homeland the Syrians will long remember. By the blood of those heroes the land [or lands – al-bilād] won title to be purified of the Turkish element’ [= Ottoman phraseology] “and the corruptions it wrought”. True, the Catholic writer remained aware of the separateness of faith of those recent allies. However, he felt obliged to “richly praise the patriotism of our Arab Muslim brothers who – despite their religious bonds with the Turks – were not deceived by their lying promises but kept up their fury at the injustices and terrible crimes they committed.” Jamāl Pasha’s ill-advised repression dug “a deep ravine that irreversibly separated the two [Ottoman] elements/ethnic groups (al-‘insurayn).”

In this sector, the tribute to the two bearers of the standard of ultra-particularism and a sort of spiritual fusion with France, does have a sense of commonality in the face of the Turks at least that could blur the nation in Lebanon out into some wider Arab political nation. The memorization of martyrdom here could activate the sense of al-Arab as a cherished wide classical community in which Fr. Lūwīs Shaykhū had stressed the membership and roles of many Christians. This quicksilver margin of the tribute to the two al-Khāzīn brothers could veer either way – to Lebanese particularism or to a wider Arab linguistic nationalism. This was, though, a margin.25

25 Archbishop Abdallah AL-KHūRĪ, “Shāhidīt Lubnān: al-Shaykh Fīlib wa-l-shaykh Farīd Qīdān al-Khāzīn”, al-Mashriq (June 1921), pp. 401-408. There had been a youthful radical, post-Christian element among the Maronites who called for Lebanon’s inclusion into Ottoman parliamentarism after 1908, but also “a group of the eminent/powerful/established figures”
2. Patriarch Ilyas Buṭrus al-Ḥuwayyik versus Jamāl Pasha

During his 1922 account of Armenian suffering and death that he witnessed, the Maronite Yūzif Tawtal already termed Jamāl, the Ottoman governor of Syria during WW1, as “Jamāl Pasha the Murderer” (al-Saffāh), the epithet that would henceforth accompany his name in Lebanonist and Arabist nationalist discourses.26

During WW1, Jamāl Pasha as governor of Syria was intent to modify procedures to symbolize a partial shift of power from the Maronite church and from Mount Lebanon’s autonomous institutions towards himself and the Ottoman central government. The Empire’s central Turkish authorities had abolished the capitulations; Jamāl sent his troops into Mountain Lebanon and at one point imposed a blockade thatstarved many ordinary people there. The food-blockade came at a high-point of a long personal trial of wills between him and the Maronite Patriarch Ilyās Buṭrus al-Ḥuwayyik (appointed in 1899): Jamāl’s troops were in the Jabal (Mountain Lebanon) but he did not disarm the Maronite population, conscript them widely or prohibit them from leaving it: this suggests that he meant to let food flow in again if al-Ḥuwayyik made some gestures of subordination, which the Patriarch inventively avoided as long or as much as he could.

In early 1922, Archbishop ‘Abdallāh al-Khūrī published in the Jesuit-founded newspaper al-Bashīr a defence of stances that al-Ḥuwayyik had adopted towards Jamāl during the War. al-Khūrī conceded that a section of the Maronites felt that the Patriarch had shown weakness at one point of his protracted confrontation with the man who symbolized Turkish rule when in October 1916 he signed a statement to the effect that Jamāl had treated the populations of Lebanon and Syria well, particularly the Christians. [The well-attended demonstrations after 1918 for a Greater Lebanon unit under French tutelage were in part upward pressure from Maronite sectors that had been radicalized by the war-time suffering; it was not just that the Patriarch organized them].

Yet, while ‘Abdallāh’s 1922 memorization did not focus that aspect, it looks from his data that Jamāl had been acting in geographical Syria without much control or monitoring from Constantinople. ‘Abdallāh, an intermediary for al-Ḥuwayyik to Jamāl, recalled the latter as seeking written statements from local Christian leaders to counter articles appearing in the French press in 1916 that “the Turks” were determined to starve the Christian people to

(qawm min al-kibār): see al-Ahrām editor Dāwūd Barakāt’s obituary speech for Patriarch al-Ḥuwayyik in al-Hudā (1 February 1932), pp. 4-5. Thus, a section of the established Maronite feudal class engaged with an Ottomanist integrationism that could slash the patriarchate’s power.

extinction in Lebanon and Syria, “that he had set up gallows” – the latter was the simple truth –, “and that the Maronites were eagerly awaiting the arrival of the French so that they could join them and expel the Turks and turn their country into a French colony”. Such international reports had apprised the CUP leaders away in the capital that Jamāl had so alienated all the Syrians, the Muslims perhaps even more than the Christians, as to make their discontent threaten the Ottoman State’s hold in those lands. Jamāl Pasha’s repeated efforts to force Patriarch al-Ḥuwayyik into rituals of respect towards the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Istanbul that all non-Maronite Christian clerics accepted were to assure his faraway CUP superiors that his provinces were non-rebellious and quasi-normal.

Maronite clericist negotiators were concerned with their position and that of their populations before Turkish power. During the discussions with Jamāl on behalf of the Patriarch, ‘Abdallah replied that newspapers during wars strive to blacken the reputations of the enemy states. But the numbers of Lebanese people really were falling because at least 50,000 had died in the famine and with Lebanon now on the threshold of winter much food would have to be brought in by its close or the country would lose half its population. In al-Khūrī’s narrative, the statement of good treatment from Governor Jamāl that the Patriarch would now sign was the latter’s response to the existential crisis of Maronites in general that was now forcing him to negotiate and concede.

In the real past, Jamāl was rather pro-French culturally and he may have regretted the CUP’s entry of WW1 on the German side. But for the Patriarch, and for his subordinate Archbishop ‘Abdallah in his 1922 memorization, the connection with France was both a threat to the Maronites given the mood of the hard-pressed Turks, and a proud emblem of identity they flaunted in their face. When Jamāl questioned Maronite loyalty to the Ottoman state, ‘Abdallah responded that France had out of “love” of the Christians established many institutions in Lebanon such as the theological college in which he had learnt. The Maronites had duly loved her back, but, ‘Abdallah told Jamāl, that love had far from fostered in him “any inclination on my part for my country to become a French colony”. When Jamāl voiced the same concern of loyalty to the Patriarch in a meeting on 21 July 1915, al-Ḥuwayyik similarly put the relationship with benefactor France within a frame of the Maronites’ adhesion to the Ottoman State – which may have been his real stance up to 1908.

Jamāl Pasha was concerned in 1916 with his deteriorating standing in Istanbul, or his place in world Francophone history or perhaps how he would fare before some trial by the Allies if they won. He refuted at length images in the French press that could be construed to link him to an artificial famine. He rhetorically asked ‘Abdallah if he had sent the locusts in 1915 or stopped rain

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from falling in 1916 or organized the sea blockade by the Allied navies that cut off the flow of food and funds from the Syrian diaspora? He now sounded eager to shower the Patriarch with grain, and did get the letter of commendation out of him that the Maronite side assumed would be understood in Europe and the Americas as having been coerced.28

ʿAbdallah al-Khūrī in 1922 had characterized the non-Muslim Lebanese in religious terms as Christian vis-à-vis Jamāl and the Turks. Going further, fairly secularist-liberal historian Yūsuf Muʿawwad (c. 2000) interpreted Jamāl/the Turks as motivated by a Muslim communalism seen as having persisted among elite Ottoman Turks amid their Westernization: Jamāl was trying to maintain the ancient pattern of relations of “dominant and dominated, people of the majority and those tolerated, Muslim and dhimmi” – a late echo of themes in the Mandate-period early Katā‘īb. For Muʿawwad here, the conflict was not originated by issues articulated by the two men such as new taxes or whether or not the Ottomans should disarm or conscript the Christians: rather, the Ottoman officer Jamāl was mustering pressures and issues to bring the dhimmi to heel and call him to order.29 Archbishop al-Khūrī did not formally characterize Jamāl’s maneuvers thus in 1922 soon after the events, but many Maronites in the 20th century saw such a dhimmifying ethos constructed upon Islam as determining the attitudes of Turks and Muslim Arabs to Lebanon’s Catholics. Tendencies in early mandate-period Catholic memorization to denounce oppressive Turks in terms of Islam were contained by the sober al-Ḥuwayyik’s lack of much animus against that religion, and by Lebanese Catholics and Muslims Arabs having faced Turkish ill-treatment together – affinity that had to be highlighted to foster new Lebanonist or loose Arab political communities after WW1. During his trials of will with Jamāl, al-Ḥuwayyik had tried to present himself as in some ways an intercessor-representative for Druze/Muslim Lebanese individuals as well as for the Maronite sect: the clerical archivist Fr. Ibrāhīm Ḥarfūsh retransmitted it in 1934, in a period in which Greater Lebanon’s Christians and Muslims had to be led to unifying images of their common past if the Lebanese state was to be viable in its coming independence.

But Jamāl and his sometimes post-Muslim new Turkish elite had concerns apart from religions and sects. Pro-France sympathies among a purposeful, compact population such as the Maronites during a World War could provide a bridgehead: his duty to defend the Ottoman state’s territorial integrity bound him to clamp control down on the Maronite high clergy. No doubt, as a


schizoid sadist, Jamāl relished his power to exile the Patriarch from Lebanon at any time and harm humans who were Christian Lebanese. On another plane, as an acculturated Muslim or post-Muslim, Jamāl may have felt all he and his category of Turks had in common with Francophone elite Lebanese as against traditional Muslims. After the suffering he had ran ordinary Lebanese through by manipulating the flow of food, a crestfallen Jamāl – so Fr. Harfūsh’s 1934 memorization ran – in a December 1917 meeting with al-Ḥuwayyik confided his tensions with the German military, and seemed understanding of the Maronites’ preference for the French as mentors. In this swing, Jamāl was treating al-Ḥuwayyik as a peer in a common Francophone culture that would promote modernity, and such a respect or admiration towards the Maronites may have always been latent in his pressurizing of their leader.30
When facing Jamāl Pasha, in his untiring post-WW1 drive for a Greater Lebanon under French direction against resistance from some secularist Maronites as well as Muslims, and in the analytical sweep of his Arabic theological, social and political writings and addresses, Patriarch al-Ḥuwayyik today bulks large in any memory of Lebanon’s history. The liberal Lebanese nationalist Dr. ‘Isām Khalīfah, a Maronite, in 1997 historiography he also tailored to help bring all Lebanese back together after their 1975-1990 War so that they could take back sovereignty, focused on al-Ḥuwayyik’s “resistance” to the war-time famine – but also that the Patriarch tried to intercede for and get relief to local Druze/Muslims as well as Maronites during the famine; that he associated non-Catholic sects with his lobbying for an expanded Lebanon, separation from Syria and the French mandate after the War; and that he wanted to minimize France’s new control.31 Gouraud’s 1920 proclamation of that state was the first of two crucial turning-points for the construction of Lebanese sovereign nationhood, yet current inclusive Lebanonist intellectuals and academics do not then proceed to celebrate al-Ḥuwayyik as an icon-founder of Lebanon: his clerical function, and his long relation with the French, rule out acceptance by descendants of the Muslim populations that were incorporated by his efforts abroad more than by choice from them.
The sufferings of Mount Lebanon’s Christians during World War I in the aftermath fuelled support among Catholics for a mandate by France. In the first item of the first issue in which al-Mashriq resumed publication in January 1920, Shaykh argued for France as the coming mandatory with reference to


31 Dr. ‘Isām Kanālī Khalīfah, Shakhšīyyāt bā‘īsah fi tā‘īkh Lubmān al-mu‘āṣir (Beirut, 1991), pp. 6-13 and 15.
the war-time sufferings of the Christians of Mount Lebanon. The break of five years that “the calamities” (= war-time conditions) imposed upon *al-Mashriq* had been borne by its editors with [religion-inspired] *ṣabr* (patience/resignation/endurance/steadfastness). Although a Christianity-inspired ethos, Shaykhū’s language here was certainly, as ever, tinted by Islam and its classical Arabs at every turn (“*al-sabrū l-jamil li-* ʿilmī-him ann Allāh maʿ* al-ṣabrīn*” – a straight collage by Shaykhū of the language of Q 2:249, 8:46, 8:66, 12:18, 12:83). Now, though, the aesthetic links to Arab Muslims were outweighed by the recent sufferings and the Francophone links as Shaykhū and his readers entered the new era of “hopes” that was transforming the world. Shaykhū hailed the Allies for having “entered the havoc of the war to defend civilization and the rights of the weak peoples and to break the yokes holding down those that had been enslaved”. France “in the time of its war did not lose sight of our ordeals” and had spirited through “vast sums that saved from death thousands of people who were tottering with hunger”.

Shaykhū’s editorial viewed Turkish repression and ill-treatment of his group during the war as a heightening of a long-standing struggle in which France had for centuries been the “refuge” of the Empire’s suffering [Christians]. France’s protection had won for “the remnants of Christianity in the [Ottoman] East” capitulatory privileges that reduced their sufferings but made the Turks envious. Shaykhū here had half-insight that the relationship with imperial France itself sparked some repression from the Turks who wanted to maintain their state or empire, but he could not grasp the manipulative economic motives of France’s expansion when he depicted her as always shedding her blood “for every noble principle” in the “purity of her intentions”.

This editorial said that France offered relief from early after the Turkish collapse to “those in need from every sectarian group”. But its overall presentation of France as acting in West Asia to promote as well as protect the Catholics there could alienate Muslim Arabs incorporated into the expanded homeland-unit from not just France but those Catholics who allied to her.32

Shaykhū’s harsh binary oppositions here of (a) local Christians and a France that alone can modernize them against (b) Muslim Turks are intelligible in terms of the contraction of the Lebanese population during World War I, and the destroyed economy that that disintegration had bequeathed.

In one fleeting item, Shaykhū did connect “the famine [caused by] the Turks” and post-War clashes between some Shiite Arabs and some Maronite and other Christians in southern Lebanon. The wartime “famine has turned into the war of the sharp swords” of those shedding torrents of “the blood of our murdered Christian brothers” in Marjāʿī-yun, Akkar, Tyre [all incorporated into Grand Liban] and the areas of Mar’aṣ [Southern Turkey: massacres of

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Armenians 1890, 1917] and Cicilia. This pan-Christian twinge at least of Shaykhū could conflate the Turks who systematically harmed his people and other non-Arabic Christians during World War I into various sets of local [Arab Muslims] who were more small-scale in the harm they did. Shaykhū was disturbed, though, that the French “second mother” was taking a long time to crush these [Arab Muslim] enemies as a deterrent example. This item fused France with Lebanon’s Catholics, and indeed a range of Christian populations scattered over the Middle East, but failed to name the enemies it lumped together as all “the Muslims”.

The context of items after 1920 about Turkish or Muslim hostility or atrocities in WW1, and France as a consequent protector was the growing reaction against France and in favour of community with Muslim Arabs among educated Maronites. Interpretations of WW1 were mustered in these disputes.

3. The Effects of World War 1 for Zionism and the Jews

For Shaykhū, WW1, and specifically the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire he did not love, represented a turning-point towards the restoration of political power to Jews.

In a 1920 overall study “Zionism, its Past, Present and Future”, Shaykhū with classical French-like perspective and clarity surveyed the various groups, such as the lovers of Zion, Theodor Herzl and his de-Judaized European Zionists, and the various populations of Jews, Ashkenazi and Sephardic, that got drawn to migrate to Palestine.

Like many Arab-cultured clerics in Lebanon, Shaykhū could be oddly theosophist-like while a denouncer of freemasons: he defined the revival of Jewish strength as at the expense of Christians and Muslims together [in Palestine? the Arabic-speaking countries? the world?], although the armed Western Christian tradition that also fuelled his anger had formed in violent polarization against Islam during the Crusades. The entrance of the allies into Jerusalem in 1917 reminded the Christians of its conquest in 1099 by the Crusaders under Godfrey of Bouillon [Germanic but who mainly used French]. They did not foresee that their control over Jerusalem would now be contested by the Zionist group through the secret agreements that had been concluded between the great financiers among the Jews and the English State. Shaykhū interpreted this as having been revealed by the Balfour declaration of 2 November 1917 that the British government might well foster in the coming peace a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. The al-Mashriq article referred to, and Shaykhū clearly shared, the emotions of the Muslims as well as Christians in Palestine who raised their voices in protest and presented petitions to the League of Nations and to the allied states and to the Pope, leading English local personnel to offer reassurances – that there would never

33 L. SHAYKHŪ, al-Mashriq (June 1920), p. 477.
be any Jewish government in Palestine – in which Shaykhū intimated he lacked any confidence.

World War I had placed at stake Maronite communities and crucial Catholic religious shrines in Palestine. How anti-Semitic was Shaykhū’s essay? At one place, he recognized that many Jews themselves and especially the Sephardim opposed the idea of Zionism because it threatened to harm them in various ways. Overall, though, the almost pan-Islam-like logic of Shaykhū’s usual attraction to wide religion-defined groups or blocs – macro-histories – here again made him accept that the modern Zionists did represent the past of the Jews and a globe-scattered community of diaspora Jews who responded enthusiastically to the Zionist entry of Palestine.34 Shaykhū endorsed the 1920 argument of Hayfa Maronite priest Būlus ‘Abbūd that if Britain established a state for the Jews in Palestine that would “exile or enslave all other groups”.

The ancient Israelite people in the age of its power had committed evil deeds that the prophets and Jesus excoriated: they might again against the other races.35

Lebanon’s Catholics, then, were quickly made aware that one of the most important long-term consequences of the Allied Powers’ defeat and partition of the Ottoman Empire would be a serious Jewish settlement in Palestine with a drive for political statehood. Thus the Zionist settlement one day might link the Maronites out to Arab nationalists in the region (– or provide an alternative centre of power to checkmate them?)

2. The Representation of Armenians

Mountain Lebanon’s Catholics had not interacted with Armenians just out there in the wider Ottoman Empire. In the early 19th century, Armenians in Aleppo established pious endowments (waqfs) to support charitable relief by monasteries in the Jabal’s Kisrawan area of the Armenian but perhaps also Maronite poor.36 In Shaykhū’s period, Armenians also had studied for medical degrees in St Joseph’s College in Beirut, and then, as doctors, treated Maronites: socialization that predisposed Lebanon’s clerical and specialized


35 Al-Mashriq (September 1920), p. 715.

36 Data 15 June 2001 from Dr Stefan Knost, from his PhD thesis at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales titled The Organization of Sacred Space: Muslim Waqfs Religious Institutions in Aleppo 1750-1850. The two monasteries Knost had waqf documents for were Dayr Zimār and Dayr Yaznār, both in Kisrawān. Armenian clerics were still at their Zimār (or Bzimar) monastery in 1923: al-Bashīr (22 February 1923), p. 2.
Clericist Catholic Authors ...

Catholic elites to feel for suffering Armenians during World War I.

Shaykhū’s learned journal al-Mashriq, in the wake of World War I, published two eye-witness articles recording massive deaths of Armenians under Turkish control during that conflict. The first, by the Maronite writer Yūzif Tawtal, described the arrival and fate of 300,000-400,000 Armenians driven from Anatolia to Dayr al-Zūr in an outlying province around Syria’s Euphrates river. From an old Maronite family of Aleppo, Tawtal at the time of Turkey’s 1916 violence against the Armenians had moved to the desert town to work as a Turkish-German translator. The other contribution, by the Armenian youth Badrus Arakiliyān who was only a teenager during the war, was written in French since he was educated by Jesuits in Anatolia, and then translated into Arabic by someone associated with al-Mashriq, or by Tawtal who had sheltered him as an escapee in his Dayr al-Zūr household. The tone of both testimonies was flat and sober. For instance, Tawtal gave credit to Dayr al-Zūr’s previous benign Turkish mutaqarrifs Ahmad Rashīd, and the wartime Jalāl Bey who did his best to house the expelled Armenians arriving from Turkey until the Committee of Union and Progress regime in Constantinople replaced him with “a savage beast reincarnated in a human body”. This article did not depict all Turks as evil.

Although the two items must rate as primary testimonies, the al-Mashriq editors had not sketched in the preceding political and ideological context. Prior to World War I, Armenians had not been just passive recipients of communal violence from various Muslim Ottoman groups in the districts of Asia minor in which they were most numerous. Not just political activism but urban “terrorism” had been coming from amongst the Ottoman Armenian populations that the Turks now in 1916 moved to break in a final way.

There were about 1,500,000 Armenians in the Ottoman Empire around the end of the nineteenth century, and 1,000,000 under Russian rule. Both Muslim and Christian Arabic-speakers had in the leadup to WW1 been viewing with keen interest the rapid organization of Armenian nationalism. In an 1895 letter from Paris, the Egyptian nationalist Mustafā Kāmil had urged his much less developed independence movement to seek organizational patterns from the “Eastern” (sic) Armenians’ activism.

Animus against Christian tenets or no, certain demographic realities had to have forced any conceivable Ottoman government to crush Armenian demands for independence if its support from Muslims and thus the State itself

40 ‘All Fahmī Kāmil, Muṣṭafā Kāmil Pasha fī 34 rabī‘ān, III, p. 65.
were to survive. H.G. Hogarth pointed out that there was no “geographical unit of the Ottoman Empire in which Armenians are the majority. If they cluster more thickly in the vilayets of easternmost Asia Minor than elsewhere, ... they are consistently a minority in any large administrative district”. Where, then, was it possible to constitute an autonomous Armenia? Establishing an Armenian state out of the Ottoman Empire thus had to muster the Powers’ aid for some sort of transfer of Turkish- and Kurdish-speaking Muslims out of the areas to form the new state. That threat helped spark rising violence against Armenian populations by Muslims, which some Armenian militants had courted with their own “terror” to draw in the Powers for a partition.  

When in March 1915 Russian forces advanced on Van, some Armenians there revolted. The new Armenian uprisings inside Eastern Anatolia when combined with Entente thrusts from without threatened the heartland of the Turks and their ability to maintain any kind of state. March 1915 was the month in which Ottoman officials and police suddenly deported Arakiliyan and his sister and all other Armenians from the sylvan little town of Naw Shahr, most of whose residents were Turks and Greeks. Many males over 15 were taken away and the women, teenagers and children escorted off in columns by foot to Syria: most died on the way from denial of adequate food and exposure in circuitous marches that read to have been designed by the Ottoman officials and police involved to wear them down. 

Arab observers at the time, and post-1970 Turkish and Armenian spokespersons and West-resident academics sympathetic to one or other of the two sides, concurred that by WW1 the Ottoman Armenians had been mobilized by nationalist political parties as no other populations before in the Ottoman lands and those in which Arabic is spoken. Yet the two testimonies al-Mashriq carried so soon after the quasi-genocide test how nationalist, and how politicized, the masses of these Armenians of Asia Minor had become by their final tragedy.

2.1. Religion Sustains

Overall, the two witnesses recorded little or nothing about any national or political identification that might have sustained Armenians through such extreme experiences. But there are references to a Christian God. At one point in the forced march it looked likely that Arakiliyan and his sister and her baby would drop behind the column and be left alone at the mercy of brigands: he told her “let us move forward relying on God and if our strength fails us die on the road”. Arakiliyan recalled that while waiting frozen and starving at Killis surviving on small amounts of coins the government handed out, the expelled

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Armenians observed Easter, “but our wretched condition did not allow us to at all taste the celebrations of the Christian world” [= affect to Catholic Europe]. Arakiliyan repeatedly voiced gratitude to the Catholic European missionaries in Asia Minor who had educated him and in the process converted him from Gregorian orthodoxy. After their arrival in Dayr al-Zūr in June 1916, Arakiliyan, close to death imprisoned in an inn with other starved juvenile deportees, promises God that he will consecrate his life to the priesthood if he can slip out among the townsfolk. He did duly make himself a Catholic priest after the War.43

2.2. The Christian West

The remnants of Armenian populations that reached Syria faced ruin and possible extinction: but now they received some relief funds from the West. The divide between Protestant and non-Protestant churches ran deep in the internal societies of West Europe and the Americas, but even many Protestant Anglo-Saxons would identify with Orthodox Armenians when in polarization against Muslim Turks. Tawtal was given employment by the German Mission at Dayr al-Zūr to procure necessities and as a translator for their interactions with Turks. He thus could view the slaughter that the new mutaṣṣurīf Zakī Bey conducted against the deported Armenians from June 1916.44 During the events, financial aid was coming from European and American charitable societies via the American consulate in Aleppo, which Tawtal would convey to the refugees45, until the feral Zakī ended such transfers.

Thus, these two items about the Armenians that al-Mashriq carried somewhat bore out for Maronites early in French mandatory rule that Christian populations in the Middle East could count on substantial aid from Westerners in disregard of their Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox divides, if they came into conflict with more numerous Muslims in the region.

As well as hating neighborhood Turks, the Maronite Tawtal very much believed in the ideology of World War, of two camps of nations fighting it out around the globe and of his duty to stand with the camp that pivoted around France. When, because he was among the few who spoke fluent German, he was offered the dragoman post with the German mission, he had to accept “despite my intense partiality [as a mission-educated Catholic] for France” in the Middle East and in macro-history.46 After he was inducted into the Ottoman army, he was as overjoyed that the final British offensive from Sinai smashed the military reputation of Erich von Falkenhayn as that it drove the

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Turks from Palestine and Syria. After WW1, the Catholic priest Butrus Ghālib in his defence of an old alliance with France in the face of local reaction against her, wrote of Christians of the East without regard to their sects in the face of Muslim power: they all needed their Protector. Such pan-Christianism was not nourished by the divisive pride Arakiliyan and Tawtal voiced that they were Catholics of a West-patterned type. The Maronite Tawtal articulated pan-Catholicism rather than pan-Christianism towards the victimized Armenians he witnessed. He structured his data on the martyrdom of the Catholic Armenian priest Petros Aghājian so as to depict the Gregorian clergy as intent to harm their Catholic clerical peers, and as traffickers of deported Armenian women. Aghajanian’s relief and preaching work among all sects of the displaced Armenians quickly won the confidence of “in particular the non-Catholic Armenians who were not accustomed to encounter in their own clerics such zeal for their salvation”. Aghajanian’s expounding of the sufferings of Jesus to the victims in order to foster religious steadfastness would have looked to his Gregorian peers like poaching – a preliminary to conversion that had in it considerable abuse of some highly traumatized and dependent non-Catholics. The indigenous converted or born Catholics often shared the assumption of the West’s churches of some right or mission from God to erase the beliefs of all other confessions that claimed to be Christian, not to speak of Muslims, in the Third World. This sectarianism ran against thinking in terms of integrating a language-determined political nation for all Armenians (or one to link even just all Christians among the Lebanese).

2.3. Images of Muslim Arabs

What attitudes towards Muslim Arabs would this category of articles by or about (Catholic) Armenian survivors have promoted among Catholic Lebanese? Distinction has to be drawn between (a) images of Arab nomads and (b) those of sedentary or urban Arabs. al-Mashriq’s two articles imaged that during the marches the nomad category extorted the refugees’ dwindling monies and belongings and abducted some of the surviving females. They still lacked the attributed drive of the Turks to kill them all off. However, the item does indicate that some Arabic-speaking nomads had a kinder attitude. When the Turks heaped up the malnourished Armenian minors on carts to be taken for final drowning in the Euphrates, some who swam away found sanctuary in some camps of the Arabic-speaking nomads (al-‘urbān): the Maronite Yūsuf Sukkar recovered some such minors and looked after them for

47. Y. TAWTAL, “Ḥawādth”, p. 569.
the duration of the War. Muslim men in Dayr al-Zūr, Tawtal imaged, took Armenian women into their house but for self-gratification; when they tired of them they drove them out.51

These two items from the still-recent destruction of the Armenians were anti-Turkish, but also could have resonated to Lebanese Christian folk-memories of the 1860 Druze-Maronite-Muslim mayhem in Lebanon and Damascus. The characterization of Syria’s [Muslim] “Arabs” (= nomads? urban?) showed some as uncompassionate to at least Armenian Christians – could the Maronites build a pan-Syrian state with them? – but terminologies like “al-‘Arab” may be antique and not belong to ethnicist, national or Islam-targeting modes of thought at all.

Few al-Mashriq items much identified a language-defined Armenian group or political nation whose core would be the majority that remained still mainly Orthodox-Gregorian. The main positive community in the two items by Arakiliyan and Tawtal was that between Catholics from different areas, languages and continents – a crude pan-Catholicism more than any national community of all who spoke Armenian or any incorporative pan-Christianism.

The two writers offer little about sects-integrating language nationhood as a source of resistance from the Armenians being deported. On balance, these materials suggest that rural Armenians had been less incorporated into the pre-1918 Armenian secessionist parties than (a) early Arabo-Muslim nationalists and (b) post-WW2 Armenian and Turkish ideologues and historiography have all imaged.

Why did Shaykhū choose to publish the two items as editor of al-Mashriq? There were old Armenian monasteries in Mount Lebanon and Lebanon-Syria’s Catholic professionals studied with Catholic Armenians at St Joseph’s College in Beirut – community. Maybe he reflected that Armenian refugees now settling in Lebanon would boost the Christian component of the tensely-balanced new multi-sectarian state of Greater Lebanon. Armenians for Lebanon’s clericist Catholic intellectuals were – at least the Catholics among them – fellow-Christian co-victims of Muslim Turks. al-Mashriq in the wake of WW1 seldom voiced awareness of Armenian-speakers in general as a political nation, although one brief item by Shaykhū did endorse post-War lobbying by Armenian nationalist lobbyists in Europe for statehood under tutelage.52

Al-Mashriq conveyed images of Westerners educating, treating and coming to the aid of Armenian Christians. Some might make that endorse the option of a French mandate for Lebanon. But could Christian minorities’ connections

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51 Y. TAWTAL, “Ḥawādth”, p. 564.
52 Here, L. SHAYKHū definitely bracketed surviving Gregorian, Protestant and Catholic Armenians as one political nation: al-Mashriq (June 1920), pp. 474-475.
with Western powers bent on partitioning out the Ottoman Empire have helped detonate violence and ill-treatment from Turks? And cleric intellectual milieus may not have been able to get their sympathetic memorization of the Armenians across to some ordinary Maronites, who left only precarious, marginal lives to Armenian refugees who subsisted on, hopelessly shattered, for decades.53

3. The Famine under Turkish Occupation: The Process of Memo-rization

Al-Mashriq had authority as the apex of Lebanon’s high Catholic intellectualism, but Shaykhū publicized the much wider net of authors attempting accounts and overview-syntheses of WW1 and its Lebanon-Syria theatre in 1919-1925. The range of Christian writers in Lebanon who were attempting to produce constructions of WW1 reinforced each others’ impact on the secondary elite of journalists and politicians who diffused the new world view out to wide classes of Lebanese.54

Some discordant works had to be kept out of the register of this new Lebanese discourse. Some were by local Christians. The Maronite cleric Marun Ghusn during the War published verses in praise of the Ottoman Sultan Muhammad Rashad and the CUP’s Enver and Jamāl. Shaykhū equally rapped the ecumenical-theosophist freemason Felix Fāris for publishing in 1916 from Aleppo an Arabic translation of a German nationalist book on Germany’s progress in 25 years – he was only currying the favor of the Power that had become the ally of the ruling CUP, the Jesuit charged.55 The surpassing Maronite poet Shiblī Mallāt, too, had paid compliments to the Turkish leaders during WW1, and later excused his words as to escape exile or dispossession, and to use the links to aid the poor and the clerics.56 Yet given Mallat’s subsequent openness under the French to Arab Muslim leaders in the wide Middle East, his keeping up of contacts could have sprung from some drive for wide secular community, in which the post-traditional CUP sometimes prefigured later Muslim pan-Arabs. Such voices from Maronites and other Catholics could keep the Ottoman Empire still somewhat problematical for the incipient memorization of World War I as the closure of any community with Turks. Shaykhū was not happy that some local Muslim Arab writers, including some who were his friends, had published in solidarity with the Turks and their Caliphate during WW1, but that was a different type of problem for this new

54 For such reviews by L. SHAYKHŪ of the numerous works that Arabic Catholics and Orthodox were bringing out see al-Mashriq (February 1920), 156, (May 1920), pp. 393-394, (April 1920), pp. 309-310 and (January 1921), p. 72.
56 L. SHAYKHŪ, al-Mashriq (August 1920), 636.
The memorization of the direct Turkish occupation of the Mountain during WW1 and of the famine that occurred lacked much central direction from the weak Lebanese particularist government that France set up in 1920. Ambiguous, disturbing, unusable features in the cacophony of memories that various Catholic Lebanese voiced from the 1920s hampered the Famine from being commemorated by Lebanese state nationalism in the way that famines at the hands of a vivid enemy have been made central in the discourses of Irish and Ukrainian nationalisms.

In the early 21st century, the Westernist Maronite historian Yūsuf Mu'awwad was to question reticence about the famine in much official discourse and ritual life of the Lebanese state from 1920, and the failure of several generations of Lebanese authors to produce a single good perspective history of the WW1 period in the Jabal. Some writers asserted that the Turks deliberately starved the Christian Lebanese in retaliation for their loyalty to France. Yet some Christian families had made fortunes as middlemen, traders and brutal stockpilers of food out of the suffering and deaths of their ordinary correligionists, and duly were powerful in the system of the new Lebanon statelet throughout the 1920s and after, as some speeches of Patriarch al-Ḥuwayyik, an architect of Greater Lebanon and the mandate, hinted.\(^57\) Jamāl’s manipulation of the flow of foodstuffs in order to bring the Maronite high clerics to heel thus connected into the further development of the old feudal families and the ongoing class-formation of rising, newer bourgeois elements among the Maronites that were jostling for position against the sect’s high clerics during WW1. The post-1920 Maronite political elite was not eager to set up any recurring rituals or discourse that – as well as the Islamo-Turkish enemy – would spotlight to ordinary Maronites and Christians aspects of evolving indigenous social structure it was in some ascendant families’ interest to obscure. The events of the Famine had in them social disintegration, clan-selfishness and some profiteering atomism by fellow-Catholics that could call

\(^57\) Al-Ḥuwayyik soon after the collapse of Ottoman rule: the (he did not say Muslim) profiteers “left no commodity essential to sustain life without monopolizing it, and no source of income for poor people, however modest, that they did not seize,” Al-ḤUWAYYIK, al-Dhakhā’ir al-Saniyyah (Jūniyah: Maḥa’at al-Mursālūn al-Lubnāniyyīn, 1931), pp. 490-491. Luṭfūllūh Naṣr AL-BAKĀSIMĪ (1922) as well as the Turks like al-Ḥuwayyik blamed “the class of the rich and those who make commerce out of wars” – but perhaps also some Maronite clergy whom he hinted skimmed donations from abroad: Mas’ūd DĀHIR, “Iṣṭirāṭijiyyyat al-ḥūṣūr wa-l-tajwiḍ” didda Jabal Lubnān 1914-1918”, paper read before the ‘International Conference on the First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean’, Beirut 29 April 2001. Much of one 1921 al-Bashīr article attempted to end rumors among the laities about embezzlement by at least one high cleric of relief donations from abroad during WW1: “Ṣaffah ta’ākhūyarah fi ʿalāmal siyādat al-muṭrīn Būlūs ‘Aṣḩ aṭimmah ‘al-Ḥarb al-ʿUmūmiyyah 2”, al-Bashīr (5 February 1921), pp. 1-2; first instalment 3 February 1921, p. 1.
into question whether discourse-images of either a humane Lebanese nation-community or the Christian community sustained by a gentle God taught from churches had always had truth on the ground. The Famine could be the end of the ideologies if some parts were not tightly managed or whitewashed.

Rudiments for the neo-pagan particularist nationalism that was built up after the 1920 proclamation of Greater Lebanon were projected by Salmā Ṣā’īgh (1889-1953), who published in mostly feminist Arabic journals and journeyed to Brazil. Her articles were republished at the end of the 1930s in the hard-cover collection *Nasamāt*. Yet a problem for the construction of a new triumphalist Lebanese national ideology was caught in her apprehension that the great famine inflicted a sort of end of meaning and ideology on the Christian inhabitants of Mountain Lebanon who passed through it during WW1. The crisis in the Mountain under Jamāl Pasha had left little heart in many for post-war construction and modernization. In “Church Bells of the Season” (*nawāqīṣ al-ʿId*), Salmā Ṣā’īgh lamented the privations of the years of the war:

“Remind us, bells, of those black days (...) cold as death when the death-rattle of the dying and the curses of the crucified cut into your moaning, making us hear the lamentation of Lebanon, walking behind the great funeral procession! (...) The people entering the churches with heads bowed, coming out with hearts and souls broken and unbelieving, for hunger knows no faith! Remind us of them all, the exiled and the crucified, the starving and the persecuted”.

In “Yā bilādī” Salmā Ṣā’īgh hymned her “homeland, the Mountain of the cedar, an objective unattainable to the most ambitious of conquerors over the ages. Their invading hosts faded away one after the other but Lebanon remained until now in glorious life above its decaying monuments”. She wanted the dead civilizations the monuments such as those at Ba’labakk represented to be systematically maintained in new museums to foster the new community consciousnesses getting differentiated in Lebanon-Syria. “O sons of my land who are near and far: give me a homeland or I shall die”58.

Thus, the famine in Mount Lebanon during WW1 could offer Salmā Sāyīgh an activist or motivating message as building a Lebanese state got under way. As frequently, though, as her anger against a Turkish enemy, the social disintegration left her and ordinary Lebanese with a deadening sense of the meaningless loss of the victims, and the fragility of all ideologies. Her contribution to memory of that sector of World War I retained a communal Catholic identity to the extent that church bells remained the emblem over the group, but she had a humanist sense that beliefs could hold frail humans together only so long as the sufferings did not become too great. Her mild

feminism and injection of images from pagan pasts into her rough nationalism were at odds with the clericist Catholic ideology of the 1920s at least.

Gratitude to the French in the light of the past national suffering was implanted among educated Lebanese by use of art and new communications media. The two litterateurs Jean al-Dibs and [the freemasonic, sometimes pan-Syrian] Felix Fāris invited Beirut’s journalists and writers to an exhibition. It was of statues that Jean al-Dibs had sculpted and photographs Fāris had collected to represent “the sufferings, oppression and hunger inflicted [by the CUP regime] upon our land during the Great War and then of France’s achievements following the war– that miracle of love and magnanimity by which she lifted us up from our collapse, bandaged our wounds and revived our economic and national life”.

Al-Bashīr assessed that the audience responded to “the orator” Felix Fāris’ accompanying verbal commentary: the two intended to take the exhibition on a tour – with use of moving film – of the Americas “so that the sons of the homeland in the diaspora can witness the horrors of the war and scenes of the homeland and its population”.59

In this particular stance by Fāris and al-Dibs, depiction of the horrors the Lebanese population passed through under the CUP during World War I gave France credibility as the mandatory power with the skills as well as the affection to set the economic havoc right. Past national struggle and suffering were being implanted in the Lebanese elite and potentially wider audiences using a combination of media new in the Middle East.

The clericists and the French in unison cited the motif of past relief by France to justify the new Mandate. In 1921, a superior abbot of the Maronite Order Fr. Ighnatiyus al-Tannūrī at the Order’s seminary, along with the other monks, elaborately welcomed the Governor of Lebanon [Commander Albert] Trabaud [– whose appointment had not been welcomed by young Maronite radicals who wanted a native governor and especially not a Frenchman of peremptory military background]. One of the brothers delivered an “elegant” French speech in which he praised the governor for his “painstaking labors… today to lift the Lebanese population up into the realm of development and prosperity” [= economic and financial infrastructure, entrepreneurial private enterprise and transcontinental capitalism]. “The Governor, in thanking the superior abbot [al-Tannūrī], praised his colleagues, the clergy who are advocates for religious values” replied:

“I can never forget that bill you sent to me [during World War I] to ask for a loan of one million franks you could use for the relief of your homeland’s destitute. The French Government donated the full amount”.

Then Governor Trabaud said that since the Lebanese were the friends of

59 “Al-Fann wa-ḥubb al-waṭan”, al-Bashīr (1 October 1921), p. 3.
France and the Orient’s Frenchmen, he would “spare no effort to lift the population of the Jabal up from their fallen state, to the very summits of glory.”

This particular reconstruction of the living history of ill-treatment and famine that the Jabal’s Christians suffered in WW1 was, then, being injected by the French and a category of particularists into a forming collective identity that would simultaneously (a) differentiate Maronites/Catholics from wider Muslim speakers of Arabic, and (b) argue their almost inherent linkages to a Western power. Such post-1918 structuring of the memorization of a past of war-time suffering would made more acceptable the tutelage that was indeed to offer more modernization and prosperity to some categories of Maronites, although still leaving most rural Maronites poor when the mandate finished in the mid-1940s.

Communications from French officials under the mandate are often notable for how little community they affirmed with the Maronites and Melkites. al-Bashir’s extracts from the speech of Governor Trabaud nowhere indicated that he termed either himself or the state or the people he represented as “Christian”, or that any feelings from a shared Christianity had motivated him or other Frenchmen to come to the relief of the Maronites during the starvation. It was the Maronite order his compliments said had the religious values.

4. Some Openness to Turks Continues

A certain inconclusiveness about how many Turks set out to harm Arabic-speaking Christians, and how far, marked some early Maronite recording of memory of the World War I period in the Jabal (Mountain Lebanon). While the symbols and rituals of Christianity gave many Maronites the resolve to survive the years of the war, they were not always at once totally dichotomized against the Muslim Turks in the post-war Catholic narrative that was forming. Some capacity for openness continued in the psyche of individuals in each group, despite the extreme distrust that many Turks had vented as their empire disintegrated and died.

A mixed item of this kind was Yusuf Buṭrus Sa’d’s late 1922 piece “The Star of the Wise Men from the East”. The setting was Christmas Day 1916 and the threat of family disintegration caused by the famine as it forced the Lebanese to sell their homes, stock and lands for a little food – a perspective not far from Salmā Sā’igh’s. The impressment of doctors into the Turkish armed forces had not left many around to treat the victims of the local epidemics. Sa’d’s very literary item voiced rage that the oppressors stripped from Lebanon’s slopes [for the Empire’s military Railway] “the trees that the

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ancients had planted with such effort (...) so that they might take from Lebanon even the beautiful climate that God had given it after they sentenced its people to starvation”. A father was brought before a martial law court after light in the shape of a star was seen rising from the cave in which his ill-nourished family was sheltering on Christmas Eve. Given all the Allied warships at anchor outside Beirut and Junieh, the Turks understandably thought the Maronite rite a signal to them. After the father is taken away, a red government cow wanders to the wife and children, who then takes it to the court that is trying her provider. Touched by the family’s honesty, the court frees the husband, and grants a reward of wheat to them. The local Turkish governor, ʿAll Ziyā Pāštā, the owner of the cow, gifts it to the family out of pity at their poverty: the cow and the wheat see the family through the months of scarcities of foodstuffs that follow.

In this narrative, the incarnate Christ-god is the emblem defining Lebanon to itself and to others, and Turks as a collectivity are hated for their wartime actions. Yet a complete dichotomization against Christianity is missed: some Turks are seen as non-vicious or good. Also, the narrator states that he learnt of the arrest from overhearing a few Turkish soldiers, which could indicate that understanding of Turkish had spread more in the Jabal.  

Al-Mashriq’s accounts of WWI massacres against Armenians could deepen fear against at least the Turkish category of Muslims amongst Lebanese Christians. Yet Fr. Luis Shaykhū did in 1920 present his “salutations to some noble individuals of the defunct regime who – even if their number did not pass beyond the fingers of the hand – refused to get involved in the savagery of their fellow-Turks and indeed tried to resist their injustices… by treating the suffering people with kindness and by defending those who were being persecuted: may God reward them!”  

The publication of bilingual Arabic-Turkish volumes on Beirut and Mountain Lebanon was an ongoing outcome of the intellectual collaboration that the Lebanese had conducted with some Muslim Turks to 1919.  

Despite all they had suffered at the hands of the Ottomans during World War 1, the things that Lebanese Catholics had built up with Turks during that

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61 “Najm al-majūs”, al-Bāshīr (23 December 1922), pp. 3-4. In regard to increased ability of Maronites to read Ottoman Turkish, it is to be noted that in 1922 the al-Bāshīr editor reacted with irritation to demands by the Yeni Adana paper that Turkey get Iskandarun despite Arabic-speakers being the largest group there: “Bayn al-haqlqah wa-l-iddīʾā”, al-Bāshīr (23 December 1922), p. 161.


63 L. Shaykhū, “Al-Ādāb ʿal-ʿarabiyyah”, al-Mashriq (July 1920), p. 482; Turkish officials and Arab Jesuit scholars seem to have collaborated on the wartime Mabālith ilmīyyah wa-jītimāʾiyyah ʿamīra bi-nashri-ha lajnah mīn al-udabāʾ, which Shaykhū identified as “the most enjoyable [scholarly] book yet published about [Mountain] Lebanon”: al-Mashriq (January 1920), pp. 73-74.
Empire’s five centuries, especially the moralistic stances and pretences that always went with membership for all Ottoman groups, continued into the 1920s.

In sexual morality and their structuring of relations between the sexes, Catholicist-particularist organs and spokesmen in Lebanon voiced more sympathy for the oriental puritanism of their Muslim neighbors than for the more open permissive attitudes of a France whose Christian and modernist character they held up as some kind of model only in some contexts. In mid-1922 al-Bashir quoted the official Turkish newspaper Taqvim-i-Vaq'a that some Muslim ladies in coming to roam here and there outside their houses were violating both [Islam’s] religious law (shari‘ah) and “national morals”. The Maronite ecclesiastics of that era were not far behind Islamic-minded Turks in regard to regulating women: if they wore revealing dresses to masses the priests had to deny them the Holy Sacraments.

The memories of Turkish cruelty or dereliction against the Lebanese and other Christians during World War 1 were not strong enough to snap the “Eastern” commonality many Catholic Lebanese felt they had with the Turks vis-à-vis Westerners – even Catholic ones. An article titled “The Beauty Competition in Rio de Janeiro”, and published in the al-Bashir in 1931, mingled Catholicism’s sexual puritanism and an “Eastern” kinship with the Turks. The competitors at the international contest had been forced to wear only modest costumes due to the preceding campaigns by Brazil’s men of religion. “Eastern patriotism” had been shown by Brazil’s Christian Lebanese when they received the lonely Turkish entrant – Jewish, although they would have welcomed a Muslim Turkish woman – almost as warmly as Lebanon’s.

In the 1930s, Rafā‘īl Nakhlah and some of his Lebanese clerical colleagues monitored the functionality with which the Ataturkists widened mass education and popularized a coherent nationalist world view by a Latin-script reinvention of Turkish. Nakhlah accepted the “materialist,” positivist-like – new Turkish ruling class’ purging of the pedantic superstructure of Arabic and Persian loan words to propagate a practicable print-medium much closer to popular speech. He wanted Lebanese educationalists to follow features of the new Turkish readers that quickly taught primary school pupils rapid reading.

5. Patterns of Long-term Significance

World War 1 stands as a turning point in the development of Catholic Lebanese identity. Global warfare activated the full triple make-up (Arab-

Western-Christian) of the multi-lingual clerics. Of all groups in the Arab World, the Catholicist-Lebanese elite had the strongest simultaneous sense of the two – Middle Eastern and European – theatres of warfare together.

The war years ended forever the option of any membership by Maronites in any multi-lingual, multi-religious state or confederation headed by Turks. The strong narrative of the blood pouring out from a few individual Maronite martyrs – they functioned more than the wide famine – now ended any need to understand, let alone refute, the propositions advanced by an opposed faction of Catholics who had sought co-citizenship with Turks. The martyrs and the famine could henceforth foster interpretations of Catholic identity that tended to blend creed and homeland-polity.

Yet the other Maronite grouping carried on. Amīn al-Rayhānī after 1918 still lamented the refusal of many Catholics of the post-1908 Ottoman parliamentarism, and pan-Arab or pan-Syrian successor-ideas were developed. The classicist tastes of the clerics themselves towards literary Arabic as a language and culture fostered community with Muslim Arab neighbours. The Lebanese Maronite particularism that now was to be developed would have in it (a) a tendency that strove to build more constructive political relations with West Asia’s Muslim Arab populations, and (b) another that wanted sweeping separation and a protector West.

The war in Europe and then the arrival of racist, incompatible French soldiers and officials put in flux how all categories of Lebanon’s Catholics came to view the French and Westerners after 1918. The issue of France’s survival and the Francophone link softened the hatred the ultra-clerics had voiced against the West’s secularism and positivism. Following the French jingos, Shaykhū tried to present the War as a triumph for France and even such Catholicism as it had, but al-Mashriq’s data left no doubt of the sweeping destruction in Europe out of which all its states and all their ideologies stumbled depleted and feeble. Throughout the Mandate, Maronite cleric-politicians from the patriarchs down were discreetly aware that after WW1 the morale and purpose of their profiteering French patrons could cave at any moment – that France might leave them in the lurch.

A parliamentarism that would last in Lebanon required that Maronites and Muslims and Druze feel that they had shared culture, ideas and fruitful common enterprises in the past. But some clerics read from WW1 patterns of a camp of pan-Catholic nations vis-à-vis a Muslim Middle East back into the crusades of the Middle Ages and from there into the new 20th century. This could place Arabic-speaking Christians and Muslim Arabs in two separate warring international camps. The clerics’ themes that the French mandatory was motivated to its maternalism towards Christians by a shared (attenuated) Christianity with crusader roots could make some Muslims reluctantly put into the new statelet more opposed to “the Maronites” as well as represser France. Conversely, the forming commemoration of shared
victimization by a common Turkish enemy during WW1 increased the chances for Christians and Muslim Arabs to construct community in at least the expanded Greater Lebanon state that General Gouraud set up in 1920.

The War’s loss of life and its chaos would long make it hard for pro-clerical Catholic writers to formulate any pan-Christian ideology really able to bracket Christianity, Eastern Christians, the West and modernity. The War placed in question if any ideology or alliance could any more motivate or be viable.