In what I have always considered one of the most beautiful descriptions of the philosophical path, a renowned medieval thinker once said, through the words of a teacher talking to his pupil: 'stude ergo in hoc et ama, quia haec est intentio propter quam est humana anima, et ibi est delectatio magna et felicitas maxima'.

If ancient philosophy is—as it was said by Pierre Hadot—‘an invitation to each human being to transform himself’, an honest intellectual approach should reflect this intimate, inner dimension of it. A book on ancient philosophy needs to be, therefore, a 'spiritual exercise'. This can be done in many ways and here, is done by finding a way to write a ‘story’—or many of them—about the ‘history’ that is going to be told. Ancient philosophy was not only about ‘studying’ but also about ‘loving’, and since knowledge was understood not just as an intellectual matter but also as an existential one, a comprehensive reading of it needs to unveil, as much as possible, all the non-discursive meanings that surrounded that world. This is precisely what the reader feels when going through this book: moving from one page to another, as if they were the successive doors of a palace, it is possible to ‘see’ the philosophers gathering together arguing on the most important issues, to ‘listen’ to them whispering the secrets of life and death. More than into a mere book on the history of philosophy, opening the curtains of this work the readers get ready to enter, accommodated on their theatre seats, into one chapter of the history of the unfolding of human thought.

After the ‘Acknowledgements’ (p. IX) and ‘Notes on Contributors’ (pp. X-XV), an ‘Introduction’ (pp. 1-9) written by Andrea Falcon opens the book, the seventh volume of Brill’s Companions to Classical Reception whose Series Editor is Kyriakos N. Demetriou. The book has three big sections itself: ‘The Hellenistic Reception of Aristotle’, made up of three chapters; ‘The Post-Hellenistic

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1 Avencebrolis (Ibn Gabirol), Fons Vitae ex arabico in latinum translatum ab Iohanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino; ex codicis Parisinibus, Ampleniano, Columbino, primid editid Clemens Baeumker, Aschendorff: Münster 1895, III: 57, p. 205.

Engagement with Aristotle’, divided into two sub-sections: ‘The Peripatetic Tradition’, of five chapters, and ‘Beyond the Peripatetic Tradition’, of other seven chapters; and ‘Aristotle in Late Antiquity’, of eight chapters. After these sections, the book ends with an ‘Index of Ancient Names’ (pp. 481-483) and an ‘Index of Passages’ (pp. 484-512).

The above-mentioned ‘Introduction’ welcomes the reader to the history of the reception of Aristotle’s works and ideas in Antiquity through three sections. In the first, ‘Problems of Periodization’, the author summarises the reasons for dividing this history into three periods – the Hellenistic; the Post-Hellenistic, marked by the ‘return’ to Aristotle’s writings in the form of direct references, and including itself two different moments divided by the rise after about 250 CE of exegetical works on the Aristotelian corpus by authors whose reading aimed to integrate it into a Platonic philosophical framework; and the Late Antique. In the second section, ‘A Selective Engagement with Aristotle’, A. Falcon highlights the existence of two kinds of Aristotelian works (the school treatises and the more popular works) each of them enjoying a different level of success through history. In the last one, ‘Ancient Reactions to Aristotle’, the author points out, closing this introductory section, that resistance to Aristotle was a minority position in Antiquity and that the post-Hellenistic selective acceptance of his philosophy culminated, in Late Antiquity, with the attempt to integrate both Aristotle and Plato into a single philosophical position.

Part 1 – ‘The Hellenistic Reception of Aristotle’ – is opened by ‘Aristotle and the Hellenistic Peripatos: From Theophrastus to Critolaus’ (pp. 13-34) by David Lefebvre. Defining Aristotle’s philosophy as ‘a universal project, organized and hierarchical yet open-ended and uncertain even about central issues; unsystematic, unlike the two great Hellenistic philosophical systems (Stoicism and Epicureanism); more inclined to research and new hypotheses than to canonical doctrine; and transmitted through a complex corpus split into two parts, exoteric works and school treatises’, the author discusses the idea that Peripatetic philosophy appeared in the Hellenistic period in the context of a ‘decline’ of the school. Through a careful study of Aristotle’s successors, the author argues with this concept of ‘decline’, pointing out that the history of the Hellenistic Peripatos is much more accurately understood as an incubation period, as the aftermath of the earliest reception of Aristotle in the Peripatos itself by Theophrastus’ contemporaries – a period that, with the slow discovery of the Aristotelian school treatises, started to mutate into a new form in the first century CE.

In Aristotle and the Garden’ (pp. 35-55), Francesco Verde focuses on the presence of Aristotle in the writings of Epicurus and some Epicureans. His analysis points out that the relationship between Aristotle and Epicurus, the Peripatetics and the Epicureans, should be defined as ‘dialectical’ rather than as
‘polemical’. The author divides its study, considering firstly the very limited direct, explicit references to Aristotle in Epicurus and the Garden. Secondly, F. Verde directs his attention onto the indirect, tacit ‘traces’ along the three parts of Epicurus’ philosophical system—canonics, physics and ethics—and the Garden, showing that several Epicurean doctrines are better explained in the light of Aristotle. The study shows that between the two philosophical ‘galaxies’—Peripatetics and Epicureans—a fruitful dialogue on several doctrinal issues was developed, and that Hellenism marked no real break in the philosophical debate. In this sense, the importance of Epicurean sources for a deeper understanding of ancient Aristotelianism is highlighted, as well as the necessity of considering the relationship with Aristotle and the Peripatetics to fully comprehend Epicureanism.

The third and last chapter of this Part I, written by Thomas Bénatouil, is ‘Aristotle and the Stoa’ (pp. 56-75). Departing from the same methodological division stated in the last chapter, on the one hand, the direct, explicit presence of Aristotle in the early Stoic movement is defined as very poor (comparing it, for example, with the many references by early Stoics to past philosophers like Heraclitus, Antisthenes, Democritus, Plato and Stilpon), being found only in a few fragments of Zeno and Chrysippus. On the other hand, only some Stoic doctrines ‘securely’ depend on Aristotle’s thought. In his work, the author focuses on the early Stoics’ references to Aristotle, adopting a topical approach to extant evidence, by dealing with each of the three parts of Stoic philosophy, from Physics—where the strongest Aristotelian influence has been hypothesised but, paradoxically, the thinnest explicit evidence has been found—to Logic—a research field in which there have been many discussions on the topic of the influence of Aristotelian thought on it—to Ethics—where there is the most evidence about interactions between Stoicism and Aristotle.

The first section—‘The Peripatetic Tradition’—of Part II—entitled ‘The Post-Hellenistic Engagement with Aristotle’ as a whole—is opened by Myrto Hatzimichali, who starts his chapter, ‘Andronicus of Rhodes and the Construction of the Aristotelian Corpus’ (pp. 81-100), devoted to studying some key steps in the history of the Aristotelian corpus, with special emphasis on the role of Andronicus of Rhodes, remembering the many times forgotten beginning of the story being covered in this book: the fact that the Aristotelian texts that we nowadays have are not the works he himself published but his lectures notes, or at least highly technical treatises made to be read by the more exclusive pupils of his school. As the author says, the main value of Andronicus’ contribution was to present a holistic picture of the Aristotelian corpus that highlighted his credentials as a systematic philosopher in the face of the Stoic system, not providing an authoritative text—by writing out a fresh copy of the entire corpus or by entering corrections on existing copies—but adopting the format he
understood as being the closest to Aristotle's intention. As a matter of fact, his work had a huge impact on the transformation the Aristotelian corpus suffered from the first century BCE and that slowly led to what is nowadays known.

In the following chapter, ‘Aristotelianism in the First Century BC’ (pp. 101-119), Andrea Falcon shows that 'Aristotle' is said in many ways. The author's survey into the Peripatetic tradition of the first century BCE looks on how Peripatetics contributed to the debate on the parts of 'philosophy' -in the Stoic division, logic, physics and ethics- and on which is its starting point. Through this chapter, it is shown that Peripatetic philosophers were engaged in a dialectical conversation with Stoicism that influenced the way they read Aristotle and that their approach to the Aristotelian texts was not merely explanatory or philological but inspired by several philosophical 'agendas' -that, in the end, were the basis for the development of different and competitive interpretations of Aristotle. Therefore, in the first century BCE there was not one prevalent interpretation of Aristotle but several different ones, of the different areas of Aristotelian philosophy.

The next chapter is 'Peripatetic Ethics in the First Century BC: The Summary of Didymus' (pp. 120-137), written by Georgia Tsouni. In her paper, the author focuses on the figure of Didymus, an ancient philosopher whose real identity is still being discussed. Two titles are attributed to Didymus in Ioannes Stobaeus’ anthology of ancient wisdom written in the fifth century CE: a Summary or Epitome and a work On Philosophical Sects. Both probably refer to a single work, a doxographical summary that contained an epitomised version of the doctrines of the main philosophical schools on the major areas of philosophy. The doxographical piece, entitled Of Aristotle and the Rest of the Peripatetics on Ethics, may have been a section of this doxography, devoted to the main points of Peripatetic ethics. Both the structure and content of the doxography and also the topic problem of its hypothetical sources are given an overview through this article, which afterwards makes a comparison between it and the Antiochean account in Cicero’s On Goals 5, to conclude that, although there are similarities in the way Didymus and Antiochus reconstructed the Peripatetic position, they represented different positions in their approach to Aristotelian teachings.

In ‘Aristotelianism in the Second Century AD: Before Alexander of Aphrodisias’ (pp. 138-159), Inna Kupreeva states that although the second century CE sees a revival of Aristotelianism -whose culmination is the activity of Alexander of Aphrodisias- it is not easy to trace the history of the Peripatetic school during this period. The author firstly focuses on what is known -mainly based on later commentary traditions- of the Peripatetic philosophers and their work of this time, showing the broad range of subjects discussed in their schools in the second century CE. Afterwards, through a survey of their teachings on logic and ontology, the cosmos, the intellect and ethical topics, she argues that
much of the Peripatetic discussion of this period shows a continued engagement with the philosophical agenda set by Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic schools, motivated by the search of doctrinal consistency between different works of Aristotle and the introduction of new ideas into the Peripatetic curriculum, on the basis of the detailed knowledge that these Peripatetic philosophers had of the Aristotelian corpus.

The section is closed by Cristina Cerami, whose chapter, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias’ (pp. 160-182), approaches this author both as essentially linked to the intellectual context that preceded him and as a turning point with respect to the preceding Peripatetic tradition, up to the point that his philosophical project, usually included under the heading of ‘Aristotelianism’ or ‘Peripatetic tradition’ in the historiography of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is labelled by the author —making an analogy with the more extended historiographical category of ‘Neo-Platonism’— as ‘Neo-Aristotelianism’. With this expression, C. Cerami looks to emphasise the discontinuity between Alexander and the preceding Peripatetic tradition. Although it is with him that the Aristotelian tradition begins to approach Aristotle’s writings as a canonical corpus from a textual and a doctrinal point of view, the main novelty of his reading is his aim to establish an all-embracing philosophical system, capable of responding to the philosophical issues argued during his lifetime. This ‘new Aristotelianism’ is read by the author in the light of its implementation in logic, ontology and natural philosophy.

The next section—‘Beyond the Peripatetic tradition’—is opened by John Dillon, who, in his ‘The Reception of Aristotle in Antiochus and Cicero’ (pp. 183-201), looks to understand what ‘Aristotle’ Antiochus and Cicero had access to. As stated in this chapter, although Cicero had a great respect for Aristotle, it seems that he lacked a specific, detailed knowledge of his philosophy. Even if—as evidence suggests— the so-called ‘esoteric’ Aristotelian works were being restored to public, or at least scholarly, attention in Cicero’s lifetime, it seems that although he knew some of them, it is not easy to be sure how carefully he read them. Moreover, Antiochus—who was dead before these developments happened— was apparently not known by Cicero. The author looks to a few examples of particular philosophical doctrines —within the domains of physics, logic, rhetoric, and ethics— to see how Cicero’s and Antiochus’ acquaintances with the treatises and doctrines of Aristotle that they apparently knew influenced their own philosophical work. As the author says, Cicero ‘seems to be stuck just before the dawn of the new era’ on the history of the reception of the Aristotelian texts and ideas.

Angela Ulacco, in ‘The Appropriation of Aristotle in the Ps-Pythagorean Treatises’ (pp. 202-217), focuses on the importance of the Ps-Pythagorean treatises in the reception of Aristotle in Antiquity. Within a body of letters,
collections of precepts, poems and doxographical accounts, there is a group of philosophical treatises composed in an artificial Doric Greek employed with the intention of imitating the ancient dialect used at the time of the ancient Pythagoreans. They were written between the first century BCE and the first century CE; it is unknown if it was by a philosophical circle or personality or by different authors promoting ideas of Pythagorean philosophy. The corpus’s creation aimed to demonstrate that these same works were a model, not only for Plato but also for Aristotle, looking to present the sources of Plato and Aristotle as a systematic body of knowledge that included what it is nowadays regarded as Aristotle’s most significant insights in logic, metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. The Ps-Pythagorean texts are not a direct interpretation or an imitation of Platonic or Aristotelian works but reveal a critical attitude toward Aristotle’s work and a selective engagement with the Aristotelian corpus.

The following chapter is ‘The Reception of Aristotle in Middle Platonism: From Eudorus of Alexandria to Ammonius Saccas’ (pp. 218-237), where Alexandra Michalewski focuses on the different ways in which ‘Middle Platonism’ was influenced by different versions of Aristotelianism. Among the many intellectual currents within Middle Platonism—a period that begins in the middle of the first century BCE with Eudorus of Alexandria and concludes with Ammonius Saccas—there are some key features in which the presence of Aristotelian elements in Middle Platonic texts is evident; for example, the borrowing of some technical terms or the theory of causes. Nevertheless, the reception of Aristotle among Middle Platonists evolved considerably, from the first century BCE—when there was no rigid opposition between the approaches of Platonists and Peripatetics—to the second century CE—when the issue of the difference between the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle arose—and finally, to the third century CE—when the point was not longer to integrate some Aristotelian elements into Platonism but to show that, on the most important points of both philosophical trends, Plato and Aristotle agree.

In ‘Galen’s Reception of Aristotle’ (pp. 238-257), R. J. Hankinson focuses on Aristotle’s influence on Galen among logic and demonstration, physics and metaphysics, physiology and embryology, and psychology. This influence should be seen, firstly, in the context of a general attitude Galen had towards the past, which he compared to what he saw as a decadent present. In that comparison, he used to invoke the great names of that glorious epoch—and Aristotle was among them. Secondly, his reception of Aristotle’s thought was determined by his own interests: although he thought of himself as a philosopher and a logician, he did so because he felt these pursuits were essential to his main authentic interest: a genuinely scientific medicine. And even thought Galen admired Aristotle’s work in logic and demonstrative theory and his physics were also Aristotelian in general form, it was in his commitment to the necessity of empirical
investigation and confirmation where he had his stronger methodological connection with Aristotle. Nevertheless, his understanding of Aristotle was not acritical: he was, for him, an ambivalent figure and his attitude to him reflected this ambivalence.

The following chapter is ‘Plotinus’ Reception of Aristotle’ (pp. 258-276), where Sara Magrin summarises the development of the discussions on the history of this reception, mostly defined by two problems. From the first century BCE until the late second and early third century CE, the interpretations of Aristotelian doctrines varied significantly among Peripatetic commentators. Since Plotinus used several commentaries to interpret Aristotle’s work, the first problem deals with which Aristotle he was reading. Moreover, the second issue is what should be understood from Porphyry’s references – in his *Life of Plotinus* – to the way in which Plotinus read Peripatetic doctrines, that is, if they were appropriated by him, fitted into his Platonic framework or if, on the contrary, they were simply mentioned, maybe even to refute them, without explicitly reporting his source. In light of these discussions, the author argues that the main issue that should be considered to understand the differences between Plotinus’, and his Platonist predecessor’s, readings of Aristoteles is not how much of the Aristotelian corpus each of them knew but Plotinus’ method of philosophical inquiry. It is because of this method that Plotinus read Aristotle’s works extensively and as being in a constant dialogue with him.

Tiziano Dorandi starts his chapter – entitled ‘The Ancient Biographical Tradition on Aristotle’ (pp. 277-298) – by planting two questions that he develops through his work: ‘who was Aristotle?’ and ‘what should we take the ancient biographical tradition on Aristotle to be?’. As the author states, over the course of decades, lacunas in Aristotle’s life were filled with conjectures and suppositions, creating a biographical legend based on his presumed political ideas and his relationships with teachers, colleagues, disciples and rulers. As time went on, this biographical tradition was expressed in biographies or ‘lives’, providing a picture not only of Aristotle as a historical figure but also of the vicissitudes of his library and his literary production. This tradition unfolded into two broad currents (beyond an Arabic tradition, parts of which are drawn from today lost Greek sources) the first going back to Hermippus of Smyrna (third century BCE) and the second to Neoplatonic thinkers (starting in the fourth century CE). These biographies contain traces of Aristotle’s doctrines and of doxographical texts which combined readings of Aristotelianism from several centuries, filtered through Hellenistic and Neoplatonic philosophy.

Closing this section of the book, in ‘Aristotle in the Aëtian Placita’ (pp. 299-318), Jaap Mansfeld focuses on the Aëtian *Placita*, the foundational doxographical treatise that deals with physical philosophy. Although the *Placita* is of little value for our information on Aristotle because we still have the school treatises, it is of
great interest to understand the reception of his philosophy in antiquity. In the
*Placita*, there are some chapters in which the impact of Aristotle’s methodology
and inquiries is not very strong or not even found at all. In these, it is possible to
find the influence of some Hellenistic philosophers who were researching on
issues not found in Aristotle. In the case of Aristotle, his presence makes itself felt
in three ways: the *lemma* that contain his name-label, distributed over the
whole treatise; the *lemma* that are abstracts from the school treatises dealing
with the *doxa* of others; and the way in which Aristotelian methodology is
chosen on the treatise. As stated by the author, the *Placita* belongs with the kind
of literature that serves a practical purpose, and during its career both loses and
acquires material, until it starts to freeze up.

Part III – ‘Aristotle in Late Antiquity’ – of the book is opened by Riccardo
Chiaradonna with his chapter ‘Porphyry and the Aristotelian Tradition’ (pp. 321–
340). The chapter, after a brief contextualisation of the influence of Aristotle in
the Platonists who came before him – both taking into consideration the school
treatises and the exoteric works – is organised through two questions: ‘What is
Porphyry’s contribution to the reception of Aristotle in Antiquity’ and ‘How does
Porphyry’s engagement with Aristotle fit into his overall work?’. To answer the
first issue, the author focuses on Porphyry’s exegetical work on the *Categories*, a
work through which he shows a new, different approach to Aristotle, arguing
that Porphyry’s specific contribution is to have brought into the philosophical
background of Platonism an in-depth exegesis of Aristotle’s treatises as well as an
extensive knowledge of both Aristotle and the Aristotelian commentary
tradition. The second topic is answered by arguing that Porphyry’s exegetical
work on Aristotle is part of his harmonising reading of the pagan philosophical
tradition – even as part of Porphyry’s anti-Christian programme – and as a
response – a tacit critical engagement – to Plotinus.

The following chapter is ‘An Intellecutive Perspective on Aristotle: Iamblichus
the Divine’ (pp. 341–350), where Jan Opsomer makes a comparison between
Porphyry’s and Iamblichus’ receptions of Aristotle. Although Iamblichus’ style of
commenting became the dominant one in the Athenian, and partly in the
Alexandrian schools, it was Porphyry who inaugurated a new era of Platonic
commentators on Aristotle. Their readings of Aristotle were certainly different,
not because their perspective on these texts were held to be worthy of study but
because of the role and status attributed to them within the Platonic
philosophical system. Since he understood both Aristotle and the Peripatetic
tradition to be heirs of Pythagoras, he considered it possible to incorporate the
philosophical truths contained in Aristotle’s thought into his own. In contrast to
Porphyry, Iamblichus did not confine himself to an elucidation of Aristotle’s text
within the framework of the Aristotelian ontology but, on the contrary, he
argued that Platonic ontology was ‘contained’ in Aristotelian logics. As can be
seen in his accounts of place, time, motion and substance, his exegetical work with Aristotle’s texts refined his own Platonist metaphysical system.

In ‘Themistius’ (pp. 358-373), Arnaud Zucker starts his chapter focusing on the standing difficulties regarding the comprehension of this famous interpreter of Aristotle: his social identity, since the core of a commitment to philosophy was in his perspective engagement in political life; and the opposing evaluations of his philosophical orientation, due to his dual interest in Plato –who played a significant role in his orations– and Aristotle –to whom his exegetical work is devoted. Because of this dual interest, he tried to harmonise both philosophers, as was the rule among late commentators, as far as possible. Although Themistius was not the first to write paraphrases of philosophical texts, those he made of Aristotelian texts contributed to redefining this exegetical method and granted him a place in the history of the reception of Aristotle. Defined by himself as ‘changing the wording while keeping the idea’, he conceived a paraphrase as a sort of handbook for students of the Aristotelian texts and even though he did not intend for them to provide more than a simplified version of Aristotle’s school treatises, they became an essential component of the Aristotelian tradition.

The next chapter is ‘Syrianus and Proclus on Aristotle’ by Pieter d’Hoine (pp. 374-393). Although it was Syrianus who introduced the more critical attitude to Aristotle, which was then to be adopted by Proclus, to the Athenian school of Plutarch, both thinkers are studied altogether since the extant sources do not allow the researcher to make any sharp contrast between their approaches. They both represent a very distinct approach from other authors, such as Ammonius and Simplicius, because they –Syrianus and Proclus– did not try to dissolve the apparent contradictions between Plato and Aristotle or to argue that Aristotle’s assumptions show that he had accepted the Platonic position ‘by implication’. On the contrary, although Aristotle was not read by them for its intrinsic philosophical value but as a preparation for Plato, it was a ‘necessary’ initiation, and even when they disagree with Aristotle they found his texts worthy of a detailed refutation. P. d’Hoine, after providing a brief survey of the works in which they dealt with Aristotle, takes the reader through some of the most remarkable aspects of the reception of Aristotle in the domains of logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics.

In ‘Ammonius and the Alexandrian School’ (pp. 394-418), Michael Griffin gives a brief account of the intellectual and social context for the analysis of the Alexandrian school in the fifth and sixth century CE. After the murder of Hypatia (415 CE), in an atmosphere hostile to Paganism, the best philosophy students left Alexandria for Athens. When later in the century they returned, Alexandria appointed one of Syrianus’ most talented pupils, Hermeias, to a publicly funded chair in philosophy that was going to be inherited by his second son Ammonius.
Olympiodorus, his successor, was the last Alexandrian teacher to practise philosophy without a commitment—at least a formal one—to Christianity. This paper studies the curriculum of the Alexandrian school, which remained pagan but in the context of friendly disagreements with Christians. This curriculum included teaching philosophical arguments explicitly contrary to contemporary Christian orthodoxy, focusing firstly on studying Aristotle within a Platonist framework and then going directly into Plato’s thought. The thoughts of the main authors—Hermeias, Ammonius, Olympiodorus, Elias, David and Stephanus—are considered in this work, through which a remarkable chapter in the history of the Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle is covered.

In ‘Simplicius and Philoponus on the Authority of Aristotle’ (pp. 419-438), Pantelis Golitsis states that although these authors—who were contemporaries and attended the seminars of Ammonius, son of Hermias, in Alexandria—differed in their interpretation of Aristotle, they were both serving a religious purpose by using a philosophical method. On the one hand, Simplicius’ aim was to demolish Hellenic authorities and to establish the truth of Christianity, mainly its doctrine of creationism. In his commentaries on the Categories, Physics and On the Heavens, he read Aristotle—who was seen by him as the most authentic of Plato’s disciples—as fully sharing with Plato the truth about the first realities of cosmos—the Soul, the Intelligence and the One. On the other hand, Philoponus’ goal was to defend Hellenism as a unitary and perennial system of thought. Through his commentaries (which need to be divided between those that are his own, and those others that are transcriptions of Ammonius’ lectures, enriched with some critical observations of his own) he rejected Aristotle as an authority, countering many of his arguments in his commentaries and sometimes even openly opposing him.

Christophe Erismann, in ‘Aristoteles Latinus: The Reception of Aristotle in the Latin World’ (pp. 439-459), argues that the history of this reception can be divided into three main phases: Roman Logic in North Africa (during the fourth century BCE); the Graeco-Latin Logic of Boethius (late fifth and early sixth century CE); and the Scholarly Logic of the Encyclopaedists (during the sixth century CE). From the point of view of the author, there are five distinctive traits of this reception: the reduction of Aristotle’s philosophy to logic, a focus which determined the nature of Latin philosophical thought until the twelfth century; a lack of explicit attacks on Aristotelian positions, showing the influence of Porphyry’s perspective on the harmony between Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies; the literary genre of the texts written in Latin, most of which were for the sake of teaching Aristotle, short and scholarly in nature; the Christian faith of their authors, although it did not appear in the works of most translators or commentators; and, last but not least, the fact that they were done in Latin,
thus making it necessary to firstly create and then codify a lexicon in this language in order to express Greek philosophical concepts.

The last chapter is 'Early Christian Philosophers on Aristotle' (pp. 460-479), in which George Karamanolis focuses on the critical or even hostile approach to Aristotle held by early Christian thinkers (second to fourth century), in the context of the critical attitude these thinkers had towards pagan philosophy as a whole, although they actually set themselves in dialogue with pagan philosophical doctrines they deemed fit for their Christian frame of thought. Unlike Plato, who is often praised and quoted by early Christians, Aristotle, whose philosophy is considered a source of heresy, is rarely mentioned or cited. The author considers some key cases of this early Christian reception, considering the reasons they had for their use of Aristotle. G. Karamanolis distinguishes –proceeding chronologically– different kinds of receptions within the generally critical attitude, highlighting that this attitude changed over time, and points out Clement, who uses Aristotle’s doctrines in support of his apologetic arguments, as the first landmark in this development.

The richness of this book is shown not only by the incredible value of each of its chapters –all of them in line with the most updated research, amazingly interesting both for the neophyte and for the researcher– but also for the many methodological insights on the history of the transmission of texts and ideas that it provides. It is not only the result of a wonderful intellectual work but also a roadmap that shows how the research on the history of the reception of Aristotle has proceeded –and, even more importantly, points out countless new paths through which it is possible to continue this research.