INTERIORITY AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE:
DOMINICUS DE FLANDRIA ON THE INTERIOR SENSES

La interioridad y la experiencia humana:
Los sentidos interiores en Domingo de Flandes

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ABSTRACT

This paper takes up the topic of the interior senses and sensible cognition as elaborated by Dominic of Flanders, a fifteenth-century Dominican thinker, in his short commentary, Expositio super libros De anima. At a time when Averroistic Aristotelianism was flourishing, and as nominalism spread across the Continent, Dominic’s account of the soul and the interior senses demonstrates a commitment to Thomas Aquinas and, more broadly, scholastic realism. Dominic adopts the fourfold model of the internal senses advanced by Thomas. He carries forth Thomas’s insistence that the sensus communis is both the root (radix) and end (terminus) of sensitivity as such and the individual senses; he follows Thomas in privileging the cogitativa, and posits a more perfect form of memoria in man. Our study concludes by looking briefly at his Quaestiones in XII libros Metaphysica, where we find an innovative account of experimentum, which reveals the thought of a capable philosopher.

Key words: Internal senses, Cognition, Sensation, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, De Anima

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper takes up the topic of the interior senses as elaborated by Dominic of Flanders (ca. 1425–1479) in the relevant portions of his Expositio super libros De Anima. At a time...
when Averroistic Aristotelianism was flourishing, and as nominalism spread across the Continent, Dominic’s account of the soul and the interior senses demonstrates a commitment to Thomas Aquinas and, more broadly, scholastic realism. Dominic’s concerns are not humanistic; his presentation is thus traditional, but accurate. Nonetheless, Dominic proves to be a capable thinker. Dominic of Flanders was a Dominican Master, originally from the present-day region near Lille, who spent his mature intellectual career working in Italy. After becoming a Master of Arts at Paris, where he studied with John Versoris (†1482/1490), he entered the Dominican order at the convent of San Domenico in Bologna in 1461. There he taught philosophy and studied towards his Master of Theology with Peter of Bergamo (†1482). In 1470 he taught philosophy at the University of Florence, and then at Pisa (where the University had been transferred), from 1472 to 1474. Dominic is best known for his massive commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (*Quaestiones in XII libros Metaphysica*, also called the *Summa divinae philosophiae*; hereafter, *QM*), a work dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici.

Less well-known is a short commentary on Aristotle’s *De Anima*. This work is essentially a summary of Thomas’ own commentary on the text; however, Dominic at times incorporates treatments and material from Thomas’s other works. While the ambit of modern thinkers—i.e., those scholastics working in the 14th as well as the early 15th centuries—taken up by Dominic

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7th–21th; Oxford, Bodl., Add. A. 370 (xv), f. 62–102v; Roma, Bibl. Univ. Alessandrina 246 (xvi), f. 1–41; Torino, Bibl. Naz. H.IV.49 (xv), f. 86–135. Cf. Lapidge, M. et al., *Compendium Auctorum Latinorum Medii Aevi* (500–1500), III.1: Conradus Mutianus Rufus—Dominicus de Pantaleonibus de Florentia magister, Firenze, SIS-MEL–Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2009, p. 109. The present author is preparing an edition of this text, based upon the manuscripts, as a part of a doctoral dissertation. For the purposes of this study, we will provide citations from the following edition, offering the book, treatise, chapter, and then folio and column: *Divi Thomae Aquinatis in tres libros de Anima [...] Accedunt adhaec acustissime Quaestiones Magistri Dominici de Flandria [...],* Venetiis: Hieronymum Scotum, 1550. This edition has been chosen out of convenience for the reader, since it is easy to acquire online and legible. This edition is available through some online resources, such as the SIEPM virtual library for Medieval Philosophy: <capricorn.bc.edu/siepm/books.html>. The earliest incunable (Venetiis 1496[?]) would have been ideal, however it lacks pagination; the changes introduced into this first edition are mostly carried over into the later editions. The Latin offered here in the footnotes has introduced some minor corrections to the text in light of the manuscripts, and does not respect the punctuation of this or any other edition.

in this *De Anima* summary does not match the extensiveness of his *Metaphysics* commentary, he does argue explicitly against John of Jandun, and at times employs Giles of Rome as an authority.\(^4\) Dominic’s *Expositio super libros De Anima* (hereafter, *EDA*) enjoyed a wide circulation, owing to its being appended to many printed editions of Thomas’s own commentary on the work.\(^5\)

In Dominic’s division of the text, the divide between Books II and III of the *De Anima* occurs after the treatment of the proper, external senses, just before the elaboration of the common sense and *phantasia* (at 424b22). So, for Dominic, Book III begins precisely with the discussion which will lead to an account of the interior senses.\(^6\) Dominic includes here a brief note of the diverging opinions regarding the division of the text according to Giles, Albert the Great, and the ‘modern’ scholastics.\(^7\)

Before we turn to the text, a word concerning the background of this conceptual framework is in order. The doctrine of the so-called internal senses is not present in Aristotle.

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4 Dominic’s citation of other authors is rather sparse; he explicitly names only Giles of Rome (6), Avicenna (4), Albert the Great (3), John of Jandun (2), Averroes (1), Boethius (1), and Radulphus Brito (1). The citation of Brito (ca. 1270–ca. 1320), occurring early on in the *proemium*, is indeed a very concise elaboration of Radulphi Britonis, *Questions super librum de anima*, I.10: ‘Utrum naturalis diffinit per materiam, logicus vero per formatum;’ the text at hand has recently been edited, in De Boer, S. W., «Radulphus Brito’s Commentary on Aristotle’s *De anima*», *Vivarium*, 50 (2012), pp. 245–354.

5 Of the twenty-two editions of Thomas’ *De Anima* commentary printed between 1496–1660, seventeen included Dominic’s *EDA*. See Gauthier, R.-A., «Préface», in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia*, vol. 45,1: *Sententia libri de Anima*, Roma, Commissio Leonina, (1984), p. 19*-28*, 34*; see also Cranz, F. E., «The Publishing History of the Aristotle Commentaries of Thomas Aquinas», *Traditio*, 34 (1978), pp. 157–192, esp. 182–4. Beginning with the 1518 Venice edition, it was common that these editions include two concurrent translations of Aristotle’s text—viz., the *antiqua* of Moerbeke as well as the *nova* by Argyropoulos—followed then by Dominic’s summary. The Venice 1518 edition is notable insofar as it was prepared by Bartolomeo Spina, at the time when he had suspected that his fellow Dominican, Thomas de Vio Cajetan, had perverted Aquinas’ teaching on the soul; see Gauthier, «Préface», p. 21*. There is no reason to believe that Dominic himself utilized the new translation by Argyropoulos, and he shows no concern to impose any changes to the key terminology in Thomas’ traditional philosophical vocabulary.

6 Book III begins at the *lemma*, «Quod autem non sit sensus praeter quinque.» This *lemma* marks the location where we find William of Moerbeke’s annotation, «Apud Grecos hic incipit tertiis liber.» Throughout this paper, we will refer only to Dominic’s division of the text as found in his *Expositio*.

7 Dominic claims that Book III begins here (at 424b22) according to Thomas, however, according to Giles and Albert, it does not begin until the next *lectio* (Dominic’s following chapter, at 427a17); further, according to the *modernos*, Book III does not begin until the discussion concerning the possible and agent intellect (Dominic’s third treatise, at the *lemma*, «De parte autem animae qua sapit et intelligit,» at 429a10). It must be stated that Dominic’s elaboration, here at the beginning of Book III, is highly reminiscent of John Versoris’ *De Anima* commentary: «Hic incipit tertius libri Aristotelis, quod hic incipit investigare distinctionem intellectus a sensu, et ut dicit Sanctus Thomas sic inventur intitulatio apud grecos. Secundum autem Egidium de roma et Albertum liber tertius incipit ibi, Quomiam autem dubius differentiis, [...] sed secundum modernos liber tertius incipit ibi, De parte autem animae qua cognoscit. Sed ut dicit Egidium ista difficulitas est modico utilitatis, ideo relinquenda est,» Versoris, J., *De Anima*, Lyon, 1489, lib. II, s.p., Q. 28: ‘Utrum sint tamquam quinque sensus exteriore.‘ Regarding the conclusion of Book II, the printed editions include a brief discussion concerning its termination, while the manuscripts only make passing reference to the problem. Cf. *EDA* II, tr. 2, cap. 18, 77v, col. 2; the mss. read: «Aer autem non patitur per sensationem, ideo non oportet quod habeat olationem. Et sic terminatur secundus liber de anima secundum Doctrarem Sanctum, secus autem secundum aliis,» e.g., Oxford, Bodl., f. 92*vb*; Roma, Aless., f. 30*vb*. Gauthier has already indicated that the printed editions include not only a concordance of both Thomas’ and Dominic’s chapters prefacing each chapter, which is lacking in the manuscripts, but also some precise citations throughout which are neither found in the manuscripts; Gauthier wonders whether there is perhaps a second redaction made by Dominic, or rather whether the additional text that made its way into the editions was an intervention by the first publisher. This case found at the very end of *EDA* II is a good example of such a precise citation and related textual material which is not found in the manuscripts.
That is, no general term exists in Aristotle’s relevant works representing the collective sensitive powers which are posited besides the five proper, external senses. It cannot be doubted, however, that in both *De Anima* as well as *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, Aristotle provides an account of the common sense, *phantasia*, and memory; there is also present in these works, at least in nascent form, a capacity or operation of the soul which will later be classified an estimative faculty—*itself* having some relation to *phantasia*. The internal senses posited as such appear only later in the Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin philosophical traditions.8 Discussion concerning the classification of the internal senses (and of their localization) continued through the medieval scholastic tradition, and well into the enduring Aristotelianism of the early modern period. A classic medieval enumeration of the interior senses—and a clear episode regarding the very debate—occurs in Thomas Aquinas’s explicit reorganization of Avicenna’s model. According to Thomas’s account, Avicenna posits five interior senses: the common sense, *phantasia*, imagination, estimative power, and memory.9 (We here set aside the fact that Aquinas’s classification of Avicenna’s model is not entirely accurate.) Aquinas, however, finds a fifth power to be superfluous—i.e., one concerned with the composition and division of imagined forms, situated between estimation and imagination—and thus argues for a fourfold enumeration of the internal senses: the common sense, *phantasia*, the estimative power, and memory.10 Speaking generally, we can say that Thomas’ teacher, Albert the Great, followed Avicenna’s model, while Thomas is closer to Averroes’s elaboration of the internal senses (insofar as a fifth faculty is rejected—Thomas, however, rejects a compositive imaginative capacity, while Averroes rejects estimation as a specific faculty). Contemporaneously, Henry of Ghent posits a three-fold classification: *sensus communis*, *memoria sensitiva*, and *phantasia*.11 Later, a thinker such as Francisco Suárez would, at the end of the 16th century, take up the previous elaborations—and giving special attention to Aquinas and the Thomists—only to reduce the multiplicity of these sense powers to just one interior sense.12

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9 «Sed contra est quod Avicenna, in suo libro *De Anima*, ponit quinque potentias sensitivas interiores, scilicet *sensus communum*, *phantasiam*, *imaginativam*, *aestimativam*, et *memorativam*,» *ST* Ia, 78,4, p. 255. All Latin text from the *Summa theologiae* is taken from the Leonine Edition: *Opera Omnia*, 5: *Pars Prima Summæ Theologiae*, Romae ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1889, and page numbers refer to this volume. Text from Thomas’ *De Anima* commentary is taken from: *Opera omnia*, vol. 45,1: *Sententia libri De Anima*, Roma: Commissio Leonina, 1984.

10 «Et sic non est necesse ponere nisi quatuor vires interiores sensitivæ partis: scilicet *sensus communem* et *imaginacionem*, *aestimativam* et *memorativam*,» *ST* Ia, 78,4 c., p. 256.


II. THE COMMON SENSE

The theme of the common sense arises only after each proper, external sense has been discussed. The whole of EDA III is divided into four treatises: the first takes up the common sense; the second looks at the distinction between sense and intellect; the third treats the intellective potency, in itself and of its parts (i.e., the possible and agent intellect); and the fourth discusses the motive potency. Our discussion now will focus upon the first treatise; it is in turn divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, Dominic advances two conclusions: (1) that one must not posit another proper sense besides the five already enumerated in Book II; and (2) that another proper sense must not be posited on account of the existence of common sensibles.

The argument supporting the first conclusion of the chapter is based upon the idea that ‘perfect animals’ have all of the senses, and do not have more than the five. The proof for the major premise is as follows:

For whatever has some sense-organ—through that organ some sensible objects are naturally ordered to be known—is able to know (cognoscere) every sensible object which is naturally known by that organ; this is clear, inductively, by looking at the case of a single sense-organ; but perfect animals have every sense organ, thus they know all sensible objects and consequently have all the sense capacities. From this it is clear that there are only five exterior and proper senses—viz., sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.13

Each sense-organ is able to grasp the entire range of sensible objects proper to it. It is interesting to note that Dominic explicitly emphasizes the threefold relation of organ, object, and power in his elaboration of the perfect animal: because the perfect animal has every organ of sense (organa sensus), it thus knows all sensible objects (sensibilia) and so has every sense capacity (sensus).14

A further elaboration is advanced in order to account satisfactorily for the fivefold enumeration of the external senses, depending on the passive nature of sensation and the kinds of impression involved in its process. Since the sensitive capacity is passive, i.e. naturally apt to be impressed by external sensible objects, Dominic determines that such an impression can occur in two ways: either the sense can be impressed according to a spiritual impression alone (which is proper to sight), or it can be impressed accompanied by both a spiritual and natural impression (and this is proper to the four remaining senses). This can further occur in two ways, viz., with the natural impression arising on the part of the object, or on the part of the organ. We can arrange the following schema:

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sensus \begin{array}{l}
\text{• secundum immutationem spiritualem tantum (visus)} \\
\text{• immutatione spirituali etiam naturali • ex parte objecti • per motum localem (auditus)} \\
\text{• per alterationem (olfactus)} \\
\text{• ex parte organi • diffusum per totum corpus (tactus)} \\
\text{• in determinate parte corporis (gustus)}
\end{array}
\]

13 «Probatio maioris. Nam quicunque habet organum aliquod sensus, per quod nata sunt aliqua sensibilia cognosci, potest cognoscere omnia sensibilia, quae nata sunt cognosci per illud organum, ut patet inductive per singula organa sensus, sed animalia perfecta habent omnia organa sensus, ergo cognoscunt omnia sensibilia et per consequens habent omnes sensus [...]. Ex quo patet quod tantum sunt quinque sensus exteiiores et proprii, videlicet visus, auditus, olfactus, gustus, et tactus,» EDA III, tr. 1, cap. 1, 78r, col. 1. The text omitted here is an intervention found in all the printed editions—and lacking in the manuscripts—which inserts Thomas’ own text from his De Anima commentary into Dominic’s summary (whose treatment already closely followed Thomas).

14 Dominic draws out what Thomas, in the relevant passage in his Commentary, leaves as implied—viz., that there is an underlying capacity within the sense-organ—saying only, «set animalia perfecta habent omnia organa sensus; ergo cognoscunt omnia sensibilia» (Sent. De Anima, lib. II, cap. xxv, p. 173).
If the impression is emitted from the object, this can occur through a movement with respect to place (which is proper to hearing, since sound is transferred by a kind of locomotion) or through a medium by an alteration or transmutation (proper to smell); if the natural impression occurs on the part of the sense-organ, it will either be diffused throughout the whole body (as in the case of touch), or will occur in a determined part of the body (and this is proper to taste). Dominic’s account of the distinction among the senses here offers but Thomas’s own doctrine in succinct form. Dominici here uses this elaboration, based upon the possible kinds of impression involved in sensation in order to show that there is no sense impression left unaccounted for, and hence no proper sense lacking.

It must now be shown that another proper sense ought not be posited on account of the existence of common sense-objects. Dominic indicates that he is advancing Aristotle’s argument, appealing to the nature of per se sensation: whatever is known by one sense as its proper object is not known by another per se, but only incidentally (per accidens); the common sensibles—motion, shape, magnitude, etc.—are not known per se by any one sense, but by several; thus the common sense-objects are not proper objects of any one sense, and so we must not posit another proper sense on account of the common sensibles. The distinction between per se and per accidens sensation was taken up earlier in Book II.

After Dominic has shown that the five external senses are properly enumerated, he needs to prove that the common sense must be posited distinct from those senses; he will do this explicitly in the third chapter. However, in the second chapter, certain doubts or difficulties must be addressed. These doubts arise from the Stagirite’s elliptical remarks concerning sensation in De Anima III, 2. Dominic takes up the following: (1) whether sight perceives that it sees; (2) whether sense-objects and the sense power come into being and pass away together; and (3) why some sense-objects are destructive to the sense capacity, while others produce pleasure. These three arguments are common in the commentary tradition, drawing as they do from Aristotle’s own discussion in the text at hand. Regarding the first doubt, we draw attention to the response that contains an interesting characterization of the common sense. Dominic answers that one must say that sight, and any other particular sense, is able to be considered in two ways: in the first way, it can be considered properly (proprie)—in this way sight cannot by its action perceive its own vision; in the second way, vision can be considered in relation to the common sense—insofar as the very same impression impresses both the sight and the common sense, and it is in this way that sight can perceive its own vision, since the common sense itself distinguishes between the proper sense-objects of particular senses. Dominic elaborates upon this:

"The reason for this is because, just as the center of a circle has a certain relation to the circumference and to the lines proceeding from the circumference to the center, so too does the common sense have a relation to the particular senses and to their acts. However, no line is able to tend towards the center of the circle, except that it goes
through the circumference, therefore no single sensation is able to reach the sensitive
soul except with the mediation of the particular senses, and consequently the common
sense does have particular sensations of the species of sense.18

Thomas himself does not employ such an analogy concerning the relation of the common
and particular sense; the analogy of the centre point and circumference will again appear in
the next chapter. In the context of the first doubt, Dominic eventually infers one conclusion in
this chapter—viz., that it is necessary to posit the common sense over against the external
senses.

The third chapter completes the treatment of the common sense. The first half supports
the conclusion that the common sense must be posited for discerning among the various
sense-objects. The argument runs thus: we perceive both the difference and the agreement
among the various sense-objects insofar as they are sensible objects; but to know (cognoscere)

sense-objects insofar as they are sense-objects pertains precisely to sense, thus to perceive the
differences between various sensible objects—insofar as they are sensible—pertains to sense,
but not to a particular sense; therefore perceiving the differences among various sense-objects
belongs to the common sense. It is clear that the ability to discern among the various proper
sense-objects does not belong to a particular external sense, since either it will pertain to one
or several senses: it cannot belong to one external sense since that particular sense does not
know (cognoscit) the difference among sensible objects (e.g., sight does not know colour and
sound, properly); and it can neither belong to many senses, since it is the case that one man
knows (cognoscit) the differences among diverse sense-objects, therefore it is due to one
potency by which the various sensible objects are known.

The second half of this chapter argues that the common sense posits the difference among
the various proper senses, while it itself knows and receives those sense-objects. This conclu-
ding portion of the first treatise is important, as we find again a particular example employed
in order to elucidate the common sense, as well as a preliminary enumeration of the four
internal senses as a conclusion to the first tractatus. The concise argument to prove the con-
clusion is as follows: for someone is able to posit the difference between two things only
precisely by knowing those things, having perceived that they differ as well as their diffe-
rence; but the common sense perceives the difference of various senses, therefore it follows
that it simultaneously knows those various sense-objects.19 The argument arises that it is
impossible for the same thing to be moved by various movers at the same time: since sense, in
knowing its object, is moved (insofar as it undergoes a kind of passion), and since the various
sense-objects are contraries, it must follow that it is impossible that the common sense knows
the various sense-objects at the same time as positing the difference between them. According
to Dominic, Aristotle is not content simply to concede that what is the same in subject, yet
various at the level of conceptual abstraction, is able to be moved by contrary motions. Rather,
what is the same in subject, yet diverse in concept, is able to be moved by contrary motions
only potentially, but never in act. He continues:

18  «Cuius ratio est, quia sicut se habet centrum circuli ad circunferentiam et ad lineas procedentes a circun-
ferentia ad centrum, ita se habet sensus communis ad sensus particularis et ad actionis eorum: sed nulla linea
potest pertingere ad centrum, nisi transeat per circunferentiam, ergo nulla sensatio potest pertingere ad sensatio-
nem nisi mediantibus sensibilibus particularibus, et per consequens sensus communis habet particularis sensitio-
nes specierum sensuum,» EDA III, tr. 1, cap. 2, 78v, col. 1.

19  «Nam nullus potest ponere differentiam inter aliqua, nisi cognoscat illa, quae differunt dum eorum differ-
tentiam percipi, sed sensus communis percipit differentiam diversorum sensuum, ut patet per praecedentem
conclusionem, ergo sequitur quod simul cognoscit illa diversa sensibilia,» EDA III, tr. 1, cap. 3, 79r, col. 1.
Thus it must be said that, according to the Philosopher, the common sense is like a point, which is a center of a circle, and such a point is considered both as one and as two: it is considered as one, insofar as from it all lines proceed to the circumference; it is considered as two, however, insofar as it is the beginning of one line and the end of another. Similarly the common sense can be considered both as one or two: it is one considered as it is the root of all the exterior senses, insofar as the sensitive powers proceed from the common sense to the exterior organs; it is considered as two, insofar as it is affected by the various impressions of the exterior senses. Hence it is not unfitting that the common sense be moved simultaneously by contrary motions insofar as it is the principle and terminus of the above-stated impressions.20

The discussion here stems from Aristotle’s curious remarks at 427a10–14, which concludes De Anima III, 2. In taking up the problem of whether a single thing can be moved at one and the same time by contrary motions, Aristotle indeed answers that it can only be so potentially. Aristotle offers the following example:

Just as what is called a point is, as being at once one and two, properly said to be divisible, so here, that which discriminates is qua undivided one, and active in a single moment of time, while qua divisible it twice over uses the same dot at one and the same time. So far then as it takes the two as limit, it discriminates two separate objects with what in a sense is separated; while so far as it takes it as one, it does so with what is one and occupies in its activity a single moment of time.21

In trying to elucidate the passage, Thomas offers instead a simile of a point between two ends of a line, which can be regarded either as ‘one’ or ‘two’—either by continuing the parts of the line and so having a common end, or by taking the point to be both the end of one line and the beginning of another. Employing this model, Thomas is able to conclude: the sensitive capacity is diffused into the organs of the five senses from a kind of common root (radix communis), from which the sensing power proceeds to every organ, and also to which all impressions of each particular organ are terminated. This, then, can be considered in two ways: (1) as one principle and one terminus of all sensible impressions; and (2) as the principle and end of this or that particular sense.22 Prima facie, it seems that Dominic’s elaboration here of the common sense is closer to that of Averroes than that of Aquinas. Dominic indeed maintains Thomas’s conception of the common sense as both root (radix) and end (terminus) of

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20 «Ideo aliter dicendum est secundum Philosophum quod sensus communis se habet ut punctus, qui est centrum circuli, qui quidem punctus consideratur ut unum, et ut duo. Ut unum, inquantum ab eo procedunt omnes lineae ad circunferentiam, ut duo vero inquantum est principium unius lineae et finis alterius. Similiter sensus communis consideratur ut unus et duo. Unus, inquantum est radix omnium sensuum exteriorum, inquantum a sensu commun procedunt virtutes sensitivae ad organa exterioria. Et consideratur ut duo, inquantum immutat secundum diversas inmutationes sensuum exteriorum, unde non est inconveniens quod moveatur simul motibus contrariis inquantum est principium <et terminus> inmutationum praedictarum,» EDA III, tr. 1, cap. 3, 79r, col. 1.


22 «sic intelligendum est quod vis senciendi diffunditur in organa quinque sensuum ab aliqua una radice commun qui quidem procedit vis senciendi in omnia organa et ad quam terminatur omnes inmutationes singularorum organorum; potest ergo considerari dupliciter: uno modo prout est unum principium et unus terminus omnium sensibilium inmutationum, alio modo prout est principium et terminus huius et illius sensus,» Sent. De Anima, lib. II, cap. xxvii, p. 185.
sensitivity and the individual sense powers. However, Dominic must not have found Thomas’ analogy of the point that makes two segments of a line altogether convincing, and here instead follows other authors in the commentary tradition in discussing instead the example of the centre of a circle—such as Themistius, Averroes, Peter of Spain, Albert the Great, and Adam of Buckfield.23 A safe wager could be made that Dominic’s more proximate sources were John of Jandun24 and John Versoris.25

After the analogy of the circle, its point and circumference, a doubt arises which surmises that the exterior sense is more perfect that the common sense. To respond to this doubt—that the exterior sense is more noble, seeing as it acts as a mover for the common sense, the mover being more noble and excellent (nobilius et praestantius)—Dominic again employs the conception of common sense as the root of sensitivity: the common sense is absolutely more perfect, first since it receives sensible species in an immaterial way, and secondly since it is the root and foundational principle of every exterior sense; however, the exterior sense is said to be more perfect in a qualified way, insofar as it moves the common sense; however, the common sense for Aristotle, according to Dominic, is more perfect in an absolute consideration (simpliciter).

The second doubt that arises will give way to a first complete account of the internal senses; it is doubted whether besides the common sense and the exterior senses any other internal sense ought to be posited. Dominic’s decision to include such a discussion departs from Thomas; in the relevant lectio, Thomas offers no such schematic account of the internal senses in his Commentary. As it turns out, Dominic is following the order of topics presented by John Versoris in his commentary; in fact, the two objections listed by Dominic are the first two of four posed by Versoris (very nearly verbatim).26 Dominic’s specific responses to these objections are also adapted from Versoris.27 What is important to note here is that Dominic

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24  Cf. de Ianduno, I., Quaestiones super tres libros Aristotelis de Anima, lib. II, Q. 36, s.p., col. 211: «Et quia istud fuit difficile intelligere, ideo Aristotles induxit sermonem in via exempli, ut dicit Commentator, videmus enim quod punctus in medio circuli existens est unus secundum se, et tamen secundum quod est terminus alterius et alterius linea ductae ab ipso ad circumferentiam diversificatur, aliud enim est ipsum esse terminum huius lineae, et aliud est ipsum esse terminum alterius. Proportionabiliter autem est in proposito. Nam ille sensus communi est una virtus secundum suam essentiam, sed differt secundum diversa esse, quae recipit a diversis sensibilibus, quorum immutationes perveniunt ad ipsum, et secundum quod est alius et alius cognoscit illa diversa sensibilia, ut per formam albi cognoscit album, et per formam dulcis dulce [...].»

25  We prefer the surname ‘Versoris’ to that of ‘Versor,’ despite the fact that the latter is largely asserted in the secondary literature. Cf. Versoris, J. De Anima, Köln, 1496, lib. II, s.p.: «Utrum sensus particulares percipiant suas actiones. [...] Sensus communis potest percipere actiones sensuum particularium, patet quia sicut se habet centrum circuli ad circumferentiam, ita sensus communis ad sensus particulares. Sed nihil potest moveri ad centrum circuli ab extra nisi transuendo circumferentiam eius. Ergo nullum sensibile pervenit ad sensum communem nisi mediante sensu particulari qui mediat inter sensibile et sensum communem, ergo sicut sensus exterior reductur ad actum per suum obiectum imutans ipsum, ita sensus communis fit in actu per sensum particularem actuatum per proximum sensibile eius. Ergo sensus communis habet iudicare de actionibus sensuum particularium.»

26  Cf. Versoris, De Anima, lib. II, s.p.: «Utrum praeter quinque sensus exteriore in animalibus perfectis sunt quinque sensus interiores, scilicet sensus communis, imaginativa, fantasia, estimativa, et memoria. Arguitur quod non, quia commune non distinguuitur contra proprium, ergo sensus communis non debet enumerari inter potentias sensitivas praeter sensus exteriore. Secundo. Fantastiatum et memoratum sunt passiones primi sensitivi, scilicet sensus communis, sed passio non distinguuitur contra suum subjectum, ergo fantasia et memoria non distinguuitur a sensu communi.»

27  «Ad primum dicendum quod licet commune per praedicationem non distinguatur contra proprium, commune tamen per cognoscibilitatem et causalitatem distinguuntur contra proprium, ut in proposito. Ad secun-
offers a presentation of the internal senses that accurately follows Thomas’ fourfold model. We can arrange the following schema:

- sensus (perceptivus specierum sensatarum • ordinatur ad accipienda illas species (sensus communis)
- • perceptivus intentionum • ordinatur ad recipienda illas intentiones (aestimativa)
- • ad retinendum et conservandum eam (imaginativa)
- • ad retinendum et conservandum illas intentiones (memoria)

The concise and systematic elaboration is of course reminiscent the classic treatment in the *Summa theologiae*.29

III. PHANTASIA AND MEMORY

Dominic’s second treatise takes up *De Anima* III, 3, and is divided in turn into three chapters. The first chapter advances two conclusions: (1) that perceiving (*sapere*) and understanding (*intelligere*) are not the same as sensing (*sentire*); and (2) that *phantasia* is not the same as opinion. Dominic first shows that sensing is not the same as perceiving (for *sapere*, in the sense of ‘cognition’ and not indicative of intellectual understanding) since, while sensation belongs to all animals, perception belongs only to a restricted group. Next, Dominic shows that sensation is not the same as understanding (*intelligere*) on the grounds that the true and false belong to understanding but not to sensation, and that understanding belongs only to rational creatures. Regarding the impossibility of deception concerning the *per se* objects of sense, Dominic answers the fourth objection by specifying the first and second operations of the intellect—the first is not deceived concerning its proper intelligible object, though the second operation of the intellect is able to err in its process of separation and composition (*dividendo vel componendo*). The second conclusion is proved insofar as opinion follows from understanding, while *phantasia* follows from sense; understanding and sense are clearly distinct, so opinion and *phantasia* cannot be the same. Secondly, the ability to imagine (phanta-
tasticare) is in our power, while holding an opinion is not wholly in our power insofar as some reason or conviction is required by which we opine correctly or falsely. The objection and response that follows from this concerns the necessity of the working of the imagination in the holding of any opinion (non possumus opinari nisi phantasticando): Dominic responds, affirming the necessity of phantasia, indicating that, while it is true that we are not able to form opinions without the mediation of phantasia, it does not follow that opinion and phantasia are the same.

Once the considerations of phantasia by way of negation have been completed, the next chapter then draws to a conclusion concerning the place of phantasia among the other cognitive powers, and posits three conclusions and one corollary. Within the context of the first conclusion—that phantasia is not simply sensation in potency—we find a distinction between determinate and indeterminate phantasia: «[…] phantasia is twofold: the first kind is indeterminate and imperfect, and such a kind belongs well to all animals, which here does not pertain to the matter at hand; the other is a determinate phantasia, which has a determinate organ, and such a kind does not belong to all animals». 30 This brief attribution of the determinate phantasia to a particular organ is notable, but that is all Dominic says at this point. The division between determinate and indeterminate phantasia had indeed already occurred in Book II. In the last chapter of the first tractatus of Book II—taking up the relation among the vegetative, sensitive, motive, and appetitive parts of the soul—an objection arose that claimed phantasia to be an organic power situated in a specific part of the body; Dominic responds in a similar vein, employing the twofold distinction of phantasia, remarking that the indeterminate and imperfect phantasia is not found in a determinate part of the body, while the determinate phantasia (found only in the perfect animals) does require a specific part of the body. 31

The theme of phantasia will of course also return in the later chapters of EDA III, wherein the relation between appetitus and phantasia is discussed. Dominic there recalls the distinction between indeterminate and determinate phantasia, and then makes a further division of the latter into phantasia sensibilis and phantasia rationalis. 32 Let us for a moment, however, depart from the text at hand and refer to a separate work of Dominic’s in order to find a more synthetic treatment of this very topic.

Within the first book of his Metaphysics commentary, we find an article that takes up the question, «utrum omnia animalia habeant memoriam.» The first objection answering in the affirmative posits that memory follows from phantasia, and phantasia follows from sensation; since all animals have imagination or phantasia, all animals thus have memory. Dominic responds that phantasia is twofold, determinate and indeterminate: memory follows only from determinate phantasia, which has a specific organ in the subject and is found only in the

30 Et si dicatur contra cuicunque inest sensus, eidem inest phantasia, ut supra in secundo concessum est, ergo sicut sensus competit omnibus animalibus, ita et phantasia. Dicendum quod duplex est phantasia, quaedam est indeterminata et imperfecta, et talis bene competit omnibus animalibus, de qua non est hic ad propositum. Alia est phantasia determinata quae habet determinatum organum, et talis non inest omnibus animalibus,» EDA III, tr. 2, cap 2, 79v, col. 1.

31 «Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est phantasia: quaedam est indeterminata et imperfecta, et talis non habet determinatam partem, de qua hic est sermo, alia est phantasia determinata, quae reipiritur in animalibus quibusdam perfectis, et talis requirit determinament partem, de qua procedebat argumentatio,» EDA II, tr. 1, cap. 4, 69r, col. 1.

perfect animals having all of the senses; such a kind of phantasia is able to apprehend things removed from the sensibly present. Indeterminate phantasia however can only apprehend things in the sensibly present, and cannot imagine something removed from the here and now—such a confused phantasia is found in the imperfect animals, and memory does not follow from it. Dominic further specifies that indeterminate phantasia and the sense of touch in the lower animals are distinct only at a conceptual level (solum ratione), since in an absolute consideration what the indeterminate phantasia apprehends falls under the realm of touch, while what is apprehended as agreeable or unpleasant are said of phantasia.33 It must be noted that this account of the imperfect phantasia touches briefly upon content which broaches the powers typically attributed to the estimativa (e.g., the perception of nocivus or conveniens), which we will take up shortly.

Dominic elaborates upon a twofold memoria in the same article. The fourth objection argues that no animal lacking reason will have memory, since reminiscence is an affection of memory, yet brute animals are without reminiscence. Dominic responds that memory is twofold, perfect and imperfect: perfect memory is that of rational creatures whose property is reminiscence, which presupposes comparison and discursive operation; imperfect memory belongs to brute animals, which presupposes only a natural kind of instinct, and not reminiscence proper. The process of comparison (collatio) however, should be carefully noted to be twofold: on the one hand, it is discursive, moving from the more to the less known, which pertains to the memory belonging to man properly; on the other, comparison is taken in itself, which does not involve discursive reasoning but rather follows only from natural instinct—in this way it is fitting to posit some form of memory to brutes.34 Recalling the definition of memoria sensitiva given at the end of the first tractatus of EDA III, we emphasize here that the proper function attributed to the memory qua internal sense power follows Thomas’s elaboration in the Summa35 so far as Dominic determines the memory as ordinatur ad retinendum et conservandum illas intentiones—viz., those intentiones of the estimative or cogitative power.


34  «Ad quartum dicendum, quod duplex est memoria. Quaedam est perfecta, cuius proprietias est reminiscencia, et talis est memoria creaturae rationalis, quae non reperitur in brutis. Alia est memoria imperfecta, ad quam non sequitur reminiscencia, et talis bene reperitur in brutis: prima quidem praesupponit collationem et discursum, secunda vero non, sed solum institutum naturalum. Est tamen scindendum, quod collatio est duplex. Quaedam est discursiva, qua proceditur de magis noto ad minus notum, et haec, tantum est in homine, quae pertinet ad memoriam proprae dictam, cuius proprietias est reminisci. Alia est collatio in proprae dicta, quae non est discursiva secundum rationem, sed solum ex institutum naturae, et talem inveniri in brutis non est convenientis.» QM I, Q. 3, a. 3, p. 22, col. 1C.

35  Cf. ST Ia, 78,4, c., p. 256: «Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiantur, ordinatur vis a estimativa. Ad conservandum autem eas, vis memoriativa, quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum.»
Returning to the second treatise of *EDA*, the second chapter goes on to argue that *phantasia* is neither understanding nor science, that *phantasia* is not opinion, and then infers that *phantasia* can neither be some composite made of up sensation and opinion. The final short chapter affirms Aristotle’s well-known definition concerning *phantasia*: *phantasia est quidam motus factus a sensu secundum actum.* We here draw attention to one of the final points of this treatise: Dominic indicates that, according to Aristotle, *phantasia* sometimes is concerned with what is false. The reason for this is that, while sensation is deceived concerning the *per se* sensibles in very few instances, concerning the incidental objects of sense (*per accidens*) sensation errs often, and even more so concerning the common sensibles; thus a fortiori *phantasia* is deceived concerning phantasms, since *phantasia* withdraws farther from the root of the cognitive power. The point we should notice is the arrangement between *phantasia* and phantasms implied by Dominic’s conclusion—*phantasia circa phantasmata.* Proper and common sensibles are both *per se* objects of sensation so far as they make an impression upon the senses (and so it is interesting that the *per accidens* sensibles seem to occupy a middle ground here concerning a tendency towards error, though Aristotle himself suggests the tendency for deception concerning the common sensibles); Dominic’s conclusion implies that phantasms are related to the *phantasia* as proper objects. If we are concerned to treat Dominic as a careful reader of Thomas, then we should note that Thomas does not explicitly state that phantasms are the objects (and certainly not the proper objects) of *phantasia.* That there is room for interpretation within Thomas’s own thinking concerning the place of the phantasm is evidenced by Dominic’s ambiguity on this very matter; elsewhere in the *EDA*, he will interpret the ‘intelligible matter’ proper to mathematical science as *materia phantasiabilis.*

IV. THE ESTIMATIVE AND COGITATIVE POWER

That we have concluded our reading of the second tractatus with a consideration of the tendency towards error in the common and contingent sensibles is fitting, since in order to offer a more complete treatment of the interior senses we must turn back to Book II of Dominic’s *EDA*. It has been observed by recent commentators that the *cogitativa* in Thomas’s account of human understanding plays perhaps a more important role—some might say a more convoluted one—than the other internal senses. We can find Dominic’s treatment of

36 Cf. *ST Ia*, 78, 3, ad. 2, p. 254; Dominic follows Thomas on this point: «differentia sensibilium sumenda est secundum differentiam immutationis. Vel ergo tale sensibile nihil facit ad immutacionem sensus, vel aliquid facit. Si primum, sic est sensibile per accidens. Si secundum, sic est sensibile per se, et hoc est dupliciter, vel quia immutatio attenditur quantum ad speciem agentem, sic est sensibile per se proprium, vel quantum ad modum actionis, sic est sensibile per se commune,» *EDA* II, tr. 2, cap. 7, 73v, cols. 1–2.

37 Elsewhere, Dominic will clarify, however, that a proper sense tends more towards error concerning incidental sensibles: «Similiter visus magis decipitur circa sensibilia communia, quam circa sensibilia propria, minus tamen quam circa sensibilia alterius sensus, et magis decipitur circa sensibilia per accidens,» *QM* IV, Q. 7, a. 9, p. 210, col. 1C.

38 Cf. *EDA*, proem., 61r, col. 2: «[…] materia intelligibili, accipiendo ly intelligibile, id est phantasiabile, id est secundum quod Philosophus intellectum phantasiam nominat»; *EDA* III, tr. 3, cap. 6, 82v, col. 1: «Ad primum dicendum quod licet mathematicalia sint abstracta a materia sensibili tam communi quam individuali, tamen non sunt abstracta a materia intelligibili, id est phantasiabile;» see also *EDA* III, tr. 4, cap. 2, 83v, col. 1: «[…] phantasia potest accipi dupliciter […] Alio modo ut se extendit ad intellectum secundum quod materia phantasialis dicitur materia intelligibilis.»

39 On the cogitative power in Aquinas, the only English monograph devoted to this theme that I am aware of is Klubertanz, G. P., *The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa according to St.*
the estimative and cogitative powers in the middle of Book II, in a chapter that posits one conclusion: that the sensible objects are divided appropriately into proper (*per se*) and incidental or contingent (*per accidens*) sense-objects. That these internal senses powers appear at this part of the *EDA* follows Thomas’ own treatment in his *Commentary*.40 A sensible object either makes an impression upon the senses, or it does not. The former are *per se* sensible objects—apt by their very nature to be perceived by sense—which however are further divided on the basis of the difference of their impression, arising on the part of the active sensible species on the one hand, and on the mode of action on the other: a sense-object is *per se* and proper when it is naturally ordered to be perceived by one sense alone; however a sense-object is *per se* but common when it is apt to be perceived not by one sense alone, but by many—viz., motion, rest, number, shape, and magnitude.

Apart from these *per se* sensible objects are the *per accidens* or incidental sensibles. Dominic draws attention to the following: (1) that the incidental sensibles befall or accompany (*accidere*) the *per se* objects of sense—indeed, Dominic tells us that they are so called precisely because of this; and (2) that the incidental objects or sense are immediately perceived by some other potency, by perceiving the *per se* sense-objects, whether by some other sense, or by the intellect, or by the cogitative or estimative power.41 He offers some typical examples: something sweet being perceived incidentally by sight (as, e.g., white); seeing something in motion but understanding it to be a living thing; seeing something coloured but perceiving it to be Socrates or Plato by way of the cogitative power; and lastly the traditional example taken over from Avicenna, viz., of the sheep seeing a wolf but perceiving it to be an enemy by way of the estimative power.42

Dominic’s next note of attention considers the more ‘controversial’ and disputed role attributed to the *cogitativa*:

> It must be considered that the cogitative power pertains to the sensitive power, and is called by another name, the ‘particular reason,’ since just as the universal reason gathers together universal intentions, so too is the particular reason said to be a collection of particular intentions, or intentions of individuals. This power, which is called the cogitative power in man, is called the estimative power in brute animals, and they differ

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40 This content corresponds to: *Sent. De Anima*, lib. II, cap. xiii, p. 119–122.

41 «Consideratio tertio, quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit sensible per accidens, duae conditiones requiruntur, quorum prima est quod illud accidat sensibili per se. Secunda est quod illud percipiatur immediate ab aliqua alia potentia, percepto sensibili per se, et hoc sit vel ab alio sensu, vel ab intellectu, vel a vi cogitativa, vel a vi estimativa,» *EDA* II, tr. 2, cap. 7, 73v, col. 2.

in this: that the cogitative power apprehends the individual as it exists in a common nature, and the estimative power apprehends the individual according as it is the end or principle of some action.\footnote{43}

This elaboration of the cogitative power here is brief, and appears to share some similarity with Thomas’s exposition of this theme in the \textit{Summa}.\footnote{44} However, it contains an important element taken over from Thomas’s exposition in the relevant \textit{lectio} of his \textit{Commentary}\footnote{45}—viz., the apprehension of the individual as existing in a common nature (\textit{ut existens sub natura communis}) by way of the \textit{cogitativa}. Dominic’s discussion here is not as extensive as that of Thomas, nor does he delve into Thomas’s insistence that the \textit{cogitativa}—so far as it seems to play a pivotal role in apprehending anything precisely as ‘this’ or ‘that’ (i.e., the cognition of particulars)—has some affinity with the intellect. Thomas also makes this claim in the relevant article in the \textit{Summa}.\footnote{46} This seventh chapter continues with objections and responses concerning the \textit{per se} and \textit{per accidens} sensibles, however it concludes with a final mention of the common sense that is consonant with the arguments we have already seen ahead in Book III.

If we turn again to Dominic’s commentary on the \textit{Metaphysics}, we find again the \textit{cogitativa}. Earlier we looked at \textit{QM} I, Q. 3, a. 3, which asked whether all animals possess memory; the entire question, comprised of five articles, treats \textit{de ordine cognitionis quantum ad bruta animalia}. The question immediately following moves on to man, giving particular attention to the theme of experience, treating \textit{de gradibus cognitionis humanae, quantum ad generationem artis et experimenti}. The second article thus asks, «\textit{utrum in homine tantum sit experimentum, et si sit, utrum vita hominis regatur experimento.}» The objections argue variously that \textit{experimentum} is not particular to man, and is found in brute animals as well. The \textit{sed contra} employs the authority of Thomas, arguing that experience pertains to the particular reason, and that the particular reason cannot be found in brute animals; to the second part of the question, the \textit{sed contra} states that, according to Thomas, man’s life is governed not by experience but by universal reason. In the \textit{corpus}, Dominic argues that experience can be taken in two ways: in the first way, properly, as the collection of many particular things retained in the memory; in the second way, improperly, as a kind of habituation towards something to be pursued or avoided. The latter belongs to brute animals, while the former is the \textit{experimentum} proper to man alone. Dominic is concerned to account for uniquely human experience; such a notion of experience is immediately tied up with the cognition of particulars. But why is this experience typical to man alone? The first argument offered for this is that the collection or comparison of particular things belongs precisely to the cogitative power. Since this capacity belongs only to creatures endowed with reason, such experience cannot belong to brute animals. It does seem that such animals partake in experience, if only a small bit,
since they are able to develop habits with regard to those things to be pursued or avoided, based on many sensations and the memories of those sensations, and this somehow seems to belong to the nature of experience. Dominic adds that man is not simply governed by experience; the argument for this is that something is ruled by that which is essential and principal in it—what is essential (principale) in man is not experience, but rather universal reason. In response to an objection that posits experience to pertain to reason, Dominic answers that reason is indeed twofold: particular and universal. Experience pertains precisely to the particular reason (cogitativa), so while man is governed by universal reason it does not follow that man is governed only by experience.47

QM I, Q. 4, a. 3 asks utrum hominum genus vivat arte et rationibus. The treatment here is quite extensive, focusing in particular on Summa theologiae Q. 79 (which touches precisely on the intellectual potencies of the soul, specifically in article 9 and giving special attention to the procedure of ratiocinativum). For our current purposes, we will look at a single notandum, and isolate our concern to the cogitativa as it appears here. The cogitative power or particular reason is divided against the universal reason (or, intellective reason) so far as it discovers intentions by way of a kind of comparison or collation of particulars. This is consonant with the treatment we have already seen. The exception here is Dominic’s brief mention of medici who assign the cogitativa to a determinate organ found in the centre of the brain.48 This assignment is taken from Thomas’s Summa, which itself is owed to Avicenna. The topic of localization is not particularly important for Thomas, and Dominic seems to follow suit—especially if we consider, for example, the fondness with which Albert often gives to the theme of localization.49 This remark in the QM is a brief instance in which Dominic elaborates upon any localization of the internal sense potencies to a specific organ (or, a part of the brain); certainly, there is no occurrence throughout the EDA.50 Thus, Dominic follows Tho-

47 «Respondeo dicendum primo, quod experimentum accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo proprie secundum quod dicit collectionem plurium singulium in memoria retentorum. Alio modo accipitur improprue, pro quodam assuefactione ad aliquid prosequendum, vel fugiendum. Primo ergo modo experimentum, solum convenit homini-


49 E.g., see Albertus Magnus, Opera Omnia, vol. 5: Liber de Anima, Paris, 1890, lib. II, tr. 4, cap. vii, where he offers an account of the ancients in a digression on the interior senses. For a treatment of Albert on this theme, as well as the authority of Albert in 14th century elaborations of the internal senses, cf. Steneck, N. H., «The Problem of the Internal Senses in the Fourteenth Century» (see note 8); see also Steneck, N. H., «Albert the Great on the Classification and Localization of the Internal Senses», Isis, 65 (1974), pp. 193–211.

50 There is, admittedly, one passage in the EDA where Dominic discusses the brain in the context of the sense of smell and its object. He says that the organ of smell ought to be warm and dry, while our brains are pri-
mas in favouring what we might call an ontological approach to the soul and its powers—over against what can be seen as a physicalist approach typical of Albert and the Arabic tradition—so far as problems of localization are not of central importance for him.

V. ‘EXPERIMENTUM’ AND KNOWING PARTICULARS

In order to go in the direction of a conclusion, we will look again to the QM for a synthetic presentation of the relationship among the four interior senses. It is asked: utrum ex sensu fiat memoria, et ex memoria experimentum. In the corpus of the article, Dominic answers that memory does arise from sensation, and experience from memory. He remarks that the answer to the problem is not answered by Thomas in the relevant lectio of his Metaphysics commentary, but rather is taken up in in lectio 20 of his Posterior Analytics commentary. Thomas does indeed touch upon the theme of experimentum and its relation to sensation and memory in both the Metaphysics and Posterior Analytics commentaries; Dominic’s elaboration here however is not immediately grounded in these texts, so far as he offers a comprehensive account of the relation of the exterior senses to the interior ones, and the ordering of their activities. Dominic notes that the claim that memory arises from sensation can be taken in two ways. First, it can be taken as signifying only sequential order, as one might say that noon follows the morning—this no one will doubt, says Dominic, since it is clear that the interior sense follows external sense and understanding follows the interior sense. In another way, it might signify precisely an element of causation, and this is further divided into either a material cause (which cannot be affirmed in the present case) or a kind of efficient cause: if we are to understand the matter at hand, that memory arises from sense is true in this regard since the impressions of the exterior senses are the effective causes of the impressions of the interior sense.51

In a third notandum, Dominic claims that sensus can be taken in four ways. On the one hand, sensus can mean: (1) the sensitive potency itself; or (2) the habit of sensation—by these it cannot be said that memory arises from sensation in the sense that sensation causes memory. On the other hand, sensus can be taken to mean: (3) sensitive operation; or (4) sensitive cognition—by these latter meanings it can be said that memory arises from sensation, insofar as the cognition of the internal senses relies upon external sensory cognition. Dominic goes on to give a brief exposition of higher forms of cognition that rely upon internal sensory cognition: the intellectual cognition of logical conclusions depends upon the cognition of premises, and the intellectual cognition of propositions depends upon the cognition of terms—it is the cognition of terms or words that relies upon the cognition of the interior senses. Dominic does not further elaborate on this; however, we should note that a careful reading of ST Ia, Q. 85, a.

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51 «Uno modo, ut dicit ordinem, sicut cum dicitur, quod ex mane fit meridies, et sic nulli est dubium, quod ex sensu exteriori fit sensus interior, et ex sensu interiori fit intellectus, ordine generationis, secus est de ordine perfectionis. Alio modo accipitur, ex secundum quod denotat habitudinem causae. Et hoc dupliciter. Vel causae materialis, et sic non est concedenda praedicta conclusion. Alio modo, ut denotat habitudinem, quodammodo cau- sae efficientis, et sic, si debite intelligatur, est vera: quia inmutatio sensus exterioris, est causa effectiva, actualis inmutationis sensus interiores,» QM I, Q. 4, a. 3, p. 27, col. 1C.
2, ad. 3 may lend support to the role the interior senses might play in the formation and perception of words. Dominic then posits that there are four kinds of cognition in the soul: sensitive, memorative, experiential, and intellective cognition. To sensitive cognition pertains the exterior senses, while memorative and experiential cognition both belong to the interior senses; intellective cognition naturally belongs to understanding. Dominic emphasizes that the latter kinds of cognition each depend upon the lower.52

Dominic continues with a final notandum, which presents a comprehensive elaboration and explicit ordering of the internal senses’ powers: with respect to the act of cognition, the exterior senses (and most of all sight) precede the common sense, which is ordered for the reception of sensible forms as such; as for the retention or preservation of those sensible forms, phantasia (or the vis imaginativa) is assigned, which follows from the common sense; then the estimative power follows, which is ordered for the receiving and apprehension of intentions not gained through external sensation concerning the agreeable or harmful—again, the cogitativa or particular reason in man; lastly follows the memorative power, which is ordered for the preservation of such species, for this potency is a treasury of these intentions. The power of memory in man, however, extends beyond the capacity of brute animals, since by reminiscence man can search into the memory of the past in a syllogistic manner. Speaking of the order of the sensitive capacities, Dominic restates that the common sense arises from the external sense, phantasia arises from the common sense, the estimative/cogitative from phantasia, and the memory from the cogitative.53

The merit of Dominic’s elaboration, as we find in his QM, lies in the very conception of a continuous ontological chain or hierarchy among the sensitive powers themselves, and not merely the reliance of the intellective upon the sensitive, and the sensitive upon the vegetative. Dominic seems perceptive to the elevated role that Thomas gives to the cogitativa, however he downplays this in his EDA. A sign of this is that the cogitativa reappears only once in the final two treatises of EDA III: viz., in the treatment of appetite, where the ratio particularis is offered as the principle of locomotion in man. If we grant to Dominic the reliance of the cognition of terms or words upon the interior sense, then this further implies something of a direct line which extends from the intellective realm into the sensitive, or vice versa. Does such a ‘direct line’ violate those ontological principles which prohibit the sensitive from encroaching upon the intellective? Sense, after all, is cognizant of particulars, and the intellect of universals. Or, is it rather the case that the realm between sense and intellect—a realm which of necessity is phantasmal—remains ever-opaque. Thomas does grant the intellectual cognition of particulars, albeit such cognition is indirect and...


53  «Haec autem vis, in homine addit supra memoriam in brutis, reminiscentiam, tanquam proprium passio-nem, quasi syllogistice inquiring praeteritorum memoriam, ut expresse dicit Doctor Sanctus in prima parte, quaeestione 78 articulo ultimo. Ex quo patet, quod si illa praeposito, ex dicit ordinem tantum, sic ex sensu exteriore fit sensus communis, ex sensus communi fit phantasia, sive imaginative, et ex phantasia fit estimativa, sive cogi-tativa, et ex cogitativa fit memoria.» QM I, Q. 4, a. 3, p. 27, col. 2A.
by way of reflection, in the conversion towards phantasms; in the cognition of singulars the cogitativa does play a prominent role.\textsuperscript{54}

The present study has remained confined to the theme of sensible cognition, and thus has not taken up Dominic’s treatment of the operations of the intellect. It should be clear, however, that sensible cognition ought not be understood simply as the apprehension of sensible species via the external senses and the perception of material objects; rather, sensible cognition—which includes the collaborated work of the inner senses—entails also a conception of interiority that accounts for uniquely human experience. Thus we find that Dominic, in his mature work, posits memorative and experiential cognition alongside sensitive and intellectual cognition. We have shown that Dominic never veers far from the ‘Holy Doctor’ in his elaboration of the interior sense powers. Regarding Dominic’s \textit{Expositio} in particular, it is clear that it was printed and circulated in the 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} centuries precisely as a kind of compendium. It does seem that the commentary of John Versoris served as a mediating source, though it is clear that Dominic attributes the correct understanding of the text at hand to Thomas. An avenue of further research might entail a more complete analysis of Versoris and the merit of his commentary. Dominic’s treatment is an extraction of the key theses and arguments in Thomas’s work concerning the soul and its powers. Thus, we do not find many elaborations in the \textit{Expositio} which extend very much beyond the text at hand—which is not to say that there are no divergences, as we have tried to show. We have further found that Dominic does employ material from the \textit{Summa} in his exposition. If we can take our topic at hand as a kind of sample case, however, then we can tentatively conclude that Dominic’s great \textit{Metaphysics} commentary is a locus in which Dominic’s own voice is heard more clearly. Employing a complementary test case on a cognate issue would only lend support to this claim; and this certainly stands as a desideratum for further research. It is in his \textit{QM} where he weaves together additional works of Thomas in an explicit manner, as well as a variety of other authors, so as to offer a more comprehensive treatment, which lends itself to innovation. Dominic’s treatment of the sensitive powers of the soul in his \textit{Expositio super libros De Anima}, however, serves as a valuable witness as well as window through which we can survey the authority of Thomas Aquinas in the 15\textsuperscript{th} century and a distinctive conception of the soul within the scholastic tradition.

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\textsuperscript{54} See e.g., Fabro, C., «La percezione intelligibile dei singolari materiali», \textit{Angelicum}, 16 (1939), pp. 429–462. For Dominic’s treatment of the cognition of singulars, see \textit{EDA} III, tr. 3, cap. 2, 80r–81r. Dominic follows Thomas insofar as he holds that singulars are understood not directly, but rather indirectly and by way of a reflection (\textit{singularia possint indirecte et reflexe intelligi}). We should note that in this discussion in Book III—which takes up the object of the possible intellect—Dominic does not introduce the \textit{cogitativa}. 